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I. INTRODUCTION
Many current clashes between resource development and
environmental protection involve the approximately one-third of our
nation owned by the federal government.' Should the Alaska National
Wildlife Refuge be opened to oil and gas leasing? Can the federal
government site a nuclear waste repository in Nevada over the objections
of state officials? Resolving these questions requires that peculiarities of
"public land law" be brought into the equation. This demands an
understanding of the constitutional contours and statutory framework of
the field.
When first approaching the task, the uninitiated may take comfort in
the label "public land law," believing that such nomenclature indicates a
unified field of law amenable to simple outline. In reality, however, the
term is mere shorthand. Modem "public land law" covers a myriad of
individual agency mandates to manage particular lands and particular
resources. Overlaying all such mandates are general environmental
statutes.2 To add to the complexity, even the term "public land" requires
explanation.
Common understanding may equate "public lands" with all property
owned by various governmental agencies. The more sophisticated
layperson may exclude forts or prisons, and apply the designation only to
lands to which the public has access. As a legal term, however, "public
lands" has had different meanings at various times. The classic
definition of "public lands" included lands of the United States subject to
disposition under the general land laws, which would exclude lands in
National Parks.3 The current technical definition of "public lands" is
lands and interests in lands the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM")
manages.4 In contrast to these two legal definitions, the land within the
statutory mandate of the Public Land Law Review Commission included
not only BLM-managed lands, but National Park Service, Forest Service,
1. See PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION's LAND (1970). As of
1990, 29.153 percent of the nation was federally owned. BuREAu OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S.
DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 5 (1990).
2. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370(c) (West 1977 &
Supp. 1993); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
3. Kindred v. Union Pac. R., 225 U.S. 582 (1912); Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v.
Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1981). See also infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
4. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(e) (West 1986). Public lands exclude lands located on the Outer
Continental Shelf and lands held for the benefit of Indians, Aleuts and Eskirmos. Id.
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and Fish and Wildlife Service lands.5 This definition approximates the
one the sophisticated layperson might use. It will also define the scope
of this article.
This article will examine the major missions and jurisdictions of the
main federal land management systems, namely the public domain, the
national forests, national parks, wildlife refuges, and wilderness areas.
To introduce this examination, the constitutional provisions which justify
the governing statutes will be explored. Additionally, as a prelude to the
specific statutory mandates, this Article will review the system of
reservations, withdrawals, and classifications. Preemption doctrine also
will be addressed because states often desire to regulate activities on
federal lands. Finally, the Article will distinguish between multiple use
and dominant use.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR PUBLIC LAND LAW
Three provisions of the Constitution provide authority for Congress to
legislate in regard to public lands. Two are specific: the so-called
Enclave Clause6 and the Property Clause.7 The third is the more generic
Commerce Clause.8 The provisions peculiar to public land legislation
will be considered first.
A. The Enclave Clause
The Enclave Clause of Article I provides one source of authority for
public land administration. Most "public lands," however, are not
5. Pub. L. No. 88-607 §§ 1-8, 78 Stat. 986-88 (1964) (codified at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1411-1418
('Vest 1986 & Supp. 1993), expired in 1970 pursuant to 43 U.S.C.A. § 1418 (-Vest 1986)). For
general background, see Perry R. Hagenstein, Commissions and Public Land Policies: Setting the
Stage for Change, 54 DENV. L.J. 619 (1977).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. This clause is also referred to as the "Jurisdiction Clause."
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Two other authorities exist. One, the Treaty Clause, is currently
employed for wildlife management laws but is potentially broader. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, allowing bird
protection both on and off federal lands, a valid exercise of treaty power); Alaska Fish & Wildlife
Fed'n & Outdoor Council, Inc. v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1987) (ruling that a treaty may
limit the discretion of a federal agency), cert. denied sub nom. Alaska Fed'n of Natives v. Alaska
Fish & Wildlife Fed'n & Outdoor Council, Inc., 485 U.S. 988 (1988). See generally George C.
Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50
U. COLO. L. REV. 165 (1979). The second additional authority is the spending for general welfare
power. U.S. CONST. art. 1. § 8, cl. 1. It has been used to justify federal water projects that promote
the general welfare. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
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"enclaves." For example, only three parcels managed by the BLM are
"enclaves,"9 although some National Parks and other lands such as post
offices and forts fall into this category. The Enclave Clause states that
Congress may
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever over [the
District of Columbia] and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
Dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings."°
The Clause's "exclusive Legislation" is equivalent to exclusive
jurisdiction." Under this authority, a state must cede jurisdiction over
the "place" for it to be an enclave. Once a state has ceded jurisdiction,
the federal government acquires some jurisdiction. Authority under the
Enclave Clause, however, is both broader and narrower than a first
reading reveals.
The Enclave Clause power is broader than its wording indicates in two
ways. First, Congress may exercise it over more than just purchased
property. The Enclave Clause is also triggered when land owned by the
federal government is reserved for a specified purpose and a state cedes
jurisdiction. 2 Second, the catch-all "needful Buildings" in the Clause's
list of places subject to the power has been interpreted to include more
than edifices with four walls. The word "building" may include
structures such as dams, 3 or it may apply to lands used for a National
Park.14 In other words, the purposes to which enclaves may be put are
not limited, but expand to meet Congress's view of the public good.
The broadening of Congress's power under the clause is balanced by a
practical contraction of the exclusivity of its jurisdiction. Although the
Clause refers to "exclusive" federal jurisdiction, usually the state's
consent reserves some jurisdiction to it and, so long as the state's action
does not interfere with the federal purpose, custom-made jurisdictional
arrangements are possible.' For example, to prevent the federal enclaves
9. An important one is the Navy Petroleum Reserve Number 4 on the North Slope of Alaska,
where the BLM has concurrent jurisdiction with Alaska. GEORGE C. CO3GINs ET AL., FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 180 (3d ed. 1993).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
11. United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 387 (1818).
12. Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
13. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
14. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
15. Lowe, 114 U.S. at 531, 540.
804
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from becoming refuges for the lawless, one common jurisdictional
reservation is for service of process in state criminal and civil matters. 6
Another common reservation is the right to tax private property within
the enclave. 7 Therefore, the first step in ascertaining what law applies in
an enclave requires review of the terms of the particular cessation
agreement between the state and federal government.
A second practical matter brings state law into enclaves. State law
often applies to solving problems on enclaves even if the state did not
expressly reserve such jurisdiction because federal law does not
generally cover the minutiae of civil and criminal law. The Federal
Assimilated Crimes Act 8 makes some substantive state criminal law
applicable in the enclave, but federal magistrates and judges apply it.
Civil law is also "assimilated" in two ways. State law on wrongful death
and personal injury actions is applicable in enclaves pursuant to federal
statute. 9  Other state law, if not preempted by federal law,2" is
assimilated under the common law of sovereignty transfers.2 This civil
law, however, is frozen in the form in which it existed on the date the
state ceded jurisdiction.'
The Enclave Clause obviously authorizes significant legislative
activities. It applies, however, to only about 9 percent of the land owned
by the federal government.' Therefore, the Property Clause has a
greater impact.
B. The Property Clause
The most important constitutional grant of power for public land law
is the Property Clause: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
16. Id. at 528.
17. Id. at 542.
18. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 7, 13 (West 1969 & Supp. 1993). The law that is assimilated is the law
current at the time it must be applied because the Act assimilated criminal law prospectively. United
States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
19. 16 U.S.C.A. § 457 (West 1993) (applying state wrongful death and personal injury law in
enclaves and National Parks).
20. For example, federal law would govern contracts with concessionaires in a National Park. See
infra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
21. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542,546 (1885).
22. Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929) (delineating innkeeper liability by
assimilation as frozen).
23. These include lands subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction or some blend of federal and state
jurisdiction. COGGINS ET AL,., supra note 11, at 179; GEORGE C. CoGGINs, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 3.03[2] (1990).
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make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
property belonging to the United States."24 Because the Property Clause
is liberally interpreted, the federal government may not need a state to
cede jurisdiction to it under the Enclave Clause as a precondition to its
exercise of significant regulatory power." The Property Clause,
however, must be analyzed to determine the scope of the power it grants
to Congress in two geographic settings. The first is the power's extent
when public lands are directly involved. The second is whether the
power extends to legislation affecting private lands.
1. Extent of Power Over Public Lands
When public lands were in territorial status, Congress's authority to
legislate was clearly plenary. When states were created out of territories,
the status of Congress in relation to the federally owned lands within
state boundaries required more consideration. Two competing models of
the Property Clause exist to define this status, which may be labeled the
"proprietor" and the "sovereign." The Supreme Court ultimately adopted
the latter, more expansive, sovereignty model.
Some early Supreme Court cases, however, did refer to the United
States as being analogous to a "proprietor" when the public lands were at
issue.26 In this role, the United States could protect its lands from
trespass and other dangers. It could also stipulate the conditions under
which it would dispose of the lands. Commentators have referred to this
model as the "moderate classical" view. A more extreme "classical"
view, expressed in one Supreme Court opinion, states that the
government merely holds these lands as a trustee for eventual
24. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
25. Contrary to this position, one commentator has vigorously argued that the federal government
may only exercise sovereign powers under the Enclave Clause. David E. Engdahl, State and Federal
Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 296-97 (1976). This view has been criticized
both theoretically and practically. See, e.g., Roger M. Sullivan, Jr., The Fower of Congress Under
the Property Clause: A Potential Check on the Effect of the Chadha Decision on Public Land
Legislation, 6 PuB. LAND L. REV. 65, 82 (1985); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Field of Public Land
Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, 1 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1980) (noting
that Engdahl's model of sovereignty may have been the original intent of the Constitution, but was
never implemented by the courts).
26. Fort Leavenworth RR. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 526 (1885). Lowe, however, dealt with the
Enclave Power. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,539 (1976).
27. For an espousal of the view, see Engdahl, supra note 25, at 296-97 See generally COGGINS,
supra note 23, § 3.03[3] [a]; Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic" Property Clause Theory, 63
N.C.L. REV. 617 (1985).
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disposition.28 Other early Supreme Court cases, however, refer to the
Property Clause power as being "without limit."29
It is this second or "sovereign" model that resonates in two important
early public land law cases, Camfield v. United States" and Light v.
United States.3' In Camfield, the United States sought to remove a fence
that interfered with access to public lands. The Supreme Court opined
that the federal government of necessity has "a power over its own
property analogous to the police power of the several states."3 In Light,
there were two issues: whether the United States could create a National
Forest without the consent of the state in which it was located, and
whether the Forest Service could prohibit grazing without a permit
despite state law requiring a landowner to maintain a fence to keep out
livestock as a prerequisite to a trespass action. The Supreme Court
upheld both the forest reserve and the permit requirement. It referred to
the United States as holding the public lands in "trust." However, the
"trust" did not act to dictate terms to Congress:
[IUt is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered.
That is for Congress to determine .... [Rights to establish and
disestablish reserves] are rights incident to proprietorship, to say
nothing of the power of the United States as a sovereign over the
property belonging to it.33
Clearly, congressional powers exceed those of a mere proprietor. The
Property Clause enables Congress to determine the public good and
forward it by legislation.
The Supreme Court confirmed this view of the Clause's reach in the
1976 case, Kleppe v. New Mexico.34 Congress had passed the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act35 (the "Wild Horse Act") to protect "all
unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of the
28. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
29. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840). For a refutation of the historical
underpinnings of the "classic" theory see David D. Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause
Doctrine, 63 DENV. U. L. REV. 495 (1986).
30. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
31. 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
32. Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525.
33. 220 U.S. at 536-37. See Maria E. Mansfield, On the Cusp of Property Rights: Lessons from
Public Land Law, 18 ECoLOGY L.Q. 43, 84-88 (1991) (asserting that the public trust doctrine does
not create a separate substantive duty for Congress but provides an interpretive guide to courts when
Congress is less than clear).
34. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
35. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1340 (West 1985).
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United States" 6 from "capture, branding, harassment, or death. 37
Congress deemed the animals "an integral part of the natural system of
the public lands."38 The BLM was to have jurisdiction over the horses
and burros on public lands.39 The facts of the case are crucial to an
understanding of what the case did and did not hold. A grazing
permittee reported some wild burros at a well on public lands.4" The
burros met the definition of "wild" under the Wild Horse Act;4 they also
met the definition of an estray under New Mexico livestock statutes.42
State law allowed burros classified as estray to be rounded up and held.43
Therefore, the situation revealed a direct conflict between federal and
state law. The burros could not be both rounded up and protected from
being captured. Moreover, the controversy arose on public lands.
Despite this federal nexus, New Mexico maintained that the Wild Horse
Act exceeded the authority of Congress.
According to New Mexico, the Property Clause gave the United States
the rights of a proprietor. Under its reading, the federal government
could dispose of and make incidental rules about use of its lands and
protect them.4' The Wild Horse Act, therefore, did rnot fit within these
powers because it was designed to protect horses and burros, over which
the federal government did not claim ownership. New Mexico
additionally argued the Wild Horse Act impermissibly interfered with
primary state jurisdiction over wildlife.
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments. It found the Wild Horse
Act to be a valid exercise of the Property Clause powe17 for two reasons.45
First, Congress treated the animals as an integral part of the federal lands.
Because of the relationship of the horses and burros to the land, it was
possible that the Act was designed to protect federal lands. The Supreme
Court therefore recognized an argument that the Act could come within
the power of a proprietor to protect its land, but it found the Wild Horse
Act constitutional for a second reason. The Supreme Court avowed that
36. Id. § 1332(b).
37. Id. § 1331.
38. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 531.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 533.
41. Id. at 534.
42. Id. at 532, n.2.
43. Id. at 533.
44. Id. at 536.
45. Id. at 537.
Vol 68:801, 1993
Public Land Law
it had never adopted New Mexico's restrictive view of the Property
Clause: "In short, Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and
of a legislature over the public domain. . . .In our view, the 'complete
power' that Congress has over public lands necessarily includes the
power to regulate and protect the wildlife living there. 46 The plenary
authority granted under the Clause authorized the Act without the need to
find that the Wild Horse Act was designed to protect lands.
The state fared no better with its argument that the Act impermissibly
interfered with state jurisdiction. The Supreme Court stated that
jurisdiction under the Property Clause might be broader than that under
the Enclave Clause.47 Enclave Clause jurisdiction is derivative because it
is dependent on the cession or consent of a state. The Property Clause,
however, is a direct grant of power to Congress. Therefore, its exercise
could preempt state law if that was the intent of Congress.
The result of Kleppe is that Congress may legislate freely in "respect"
to public property. Subsequent cases confirmed the breadth of the
Property Clause.48  Nevertheless, the holding in Kleppe does have
limitations. The case involved wild burros on public lands, not on
private lands. Therefore, it does not answer whether the Property Clause
authorizes regulation of actions on private lands. As the Supreme Court
noted: "While it is clear that regulations under the Property Clause may
have some effect on private lands not otherwise under federal control..
., we do not think it appropriate... to determine the extent, if any, to
which the Property Clause empowers Congress to protect animals on
private lands .... -4' Additionally, the preemption of state law was clear
in Kleppe because of the direct conflict with federal law. The case does
not, therefore, delineate the full dimensions of preemption. The next
section addresses one question Kleppe left open.
2. Extent of Power over Private Lands
Federal control of activity on private property may qualify as "needful
Rules and Regulations respecting ... Property belonging to the United
46. Id. at 540-41.
47. Id. at 541-42.
48. See, e.g., Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1990) (ruling that Congress may use the
Property Clause to designate Yucca Mountain as a permanent nuclear waste depository without state
consent under the Enclave Clause); California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572,
581 (1987) (holding that Congress has "plenary power" under the Property Clause).
49. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 546.
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States"5 when required to protect federal lands in one of two ways: from
either physical harm or so that the lands will remain intact for
congressional purposes. As an example of the first type of controls, a
statute that prohibited leaving an unextinguished fire "in or near" a
public forest was interpreted to be clearly designed to protect the forest
from the physical threat of fires." Under the Property Clause, the
government could constitutionally prosecute someone who left a fire on
private property. As the Supreme Court succinctly put it in United States
v. Alford 2 "The danger depends upon the nearness of the fire, not upon
the ownership of the land where it is built.... Congress may prohibit the
doing of acts upon privately owned lands that imperil the publicly owned
forests."53
The Alford affirmance of the Property Clause power involved direct
physical peril to federal property. The courts have also extended the
concept of "harm" to include interference with congressional policy as
well as the physical integrity of the public lands. For example, Camfield
v. United States 4 affirmed the conviction of an individual who had
erected fences on private land, thereby preventing access to public land.5"
Because a fence is generally lawful, Camfield has been read as allowing
preclusion of activities that would frustrate federal policy, even if they
are not otherwise objectionable. 6 The leading modem case on this issue,
Minnesota v. Block, arose when Congress barred the use of motorized
vehicles in portions of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness that
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
51. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927) (discussing the Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat.
855).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 267. Complete refusal to allow beneficial use of private land on the grounds of
preventing damage to public lands may exceed the authority. See Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86
(1911). The Curtin Court, however, emphasized the absence of proof that the private use at issue
would cause any damage to the public land. Id. at 85.
54. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
55. Id. at 527. See also McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922) (protecting
congressional policy of free passage over public lands); Robbins v. United States, 284 F. 39, 46 (8th
Cir. 1922) (protecting congressional control of highways in national parks). More recently, the
Unlawful Enclosure Act at issue in Camfield was used to prevent a rancher from erecting a fence that
would interfere with antelope migration. United States ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 980 (1988).
56. Eugene R. Gaetke, The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978: Regulating
Nonfederal Property Under the Property Clause, 60 OR. L. REv. 157, 169-74 (1981). See also,
Joseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of Private Land, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 239, 250-55 (1976). But see Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 685 (1979)
(referring to Camfield as a nuisance case).
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included state-owned land. 7 The court in that case took the broad view
of Camfield:58 "Under this authority to protect public land, Congress's
power must extend to regulation of conduct on or off the public land that
would threaten the designated purpose of federal lands."59 Because the
motorized vehicles would interfere with wilderness aesthetics, they could
be banned.'
Most of the cases affirming federal power to regulate activities on
private land have dealt with inholdings, private interests that are within
the geographic boundaries of a public reserve.61 The federal government
has its strongest argument, therefore, when it attempts to regulate
activities undertaken on private land if those lands are surrounded by
public land and the activities directly interfere with the management of
public resources.62 Although there is no clear ruling on how far the
Property Clause extends beyond the borders of public property, existing
case law allows regulation of inholdings to prevent conflicts with
congressionally declared purposes.63
57. Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1982).
58. Id. at 1249.
59. Id. But see United States v. County Bd. of Arlington, 487 F. Supp. 137, 143-44 (E.D. Va.
1979) (finding no public nuisance in high-rise construction that would intrude on Washington's
"monumental core," therefore finding no federal power to regulate). Justice Scalia has taken a
similar view on when the government may regulate without compensation if the regulation
completely diminishes the value of private property. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112
S. Ct. 2886, 2981-02 (1992) (permitting uncompensated regulation that diminishes property's total
value only if the regulation addresses common law nuisance). Whether this reasoning may be
imported to the Property Clause setting is not yet clear. Justice Scalia dissented in California Coastal
Comm'n v. Granite Rock, 480 U.S. 572, 607 (1987), strongly arguing that the state regulation would
greatly reduce federal Property Clause power. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
60. The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978 revisited some of these issues. See
Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Robertson, 978 F.2d 1484 (8th Cir. 1992)
(disallowing motorized portages because portaging boats between certain waters was "feasible"
without motorized equipment).
61. See also United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lindsey,
595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
949 (1977); Wilkenson v. Department of Interior, 634 F. Supp. 1265, 1279 (D. Colo. 1986).
62. See George C. Coggins, Protecting the Wildlife Resources of National Parks from External
Threats, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1987); Robert B. Keiter, Taking Account of the
Ecosystem on the Public Domain: Law and Ecology in the Greater Yellowstone Region, 60 U. COLO.
L. REV. 923, 952 (1989); H. Barry Holt, Property Clause Regulation Off Federal Lands: An
Analysis, and Possible Application to Indian Treaty Rights, 19 ENVTL. L. 295, 303-08 (1988). But
see Daniel Rohlf & Douglas L. Honnold, Managing the Balances of Nature: The Legal Framework
of Wilderness Management, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 273-75 (1988) (questioning whether the
Wilderness Act requires agency to control surrounding areas).
63. A second way to regulate such activities may be to condition ancillary permits needed for
access or development. See Mansfield, supra note 33, at 53-54.
Washington Law Review
Nevertheless, if the "plenary" power of the Property Clause is
interpreted literally, Congress and federal agencies could regulate any
activity that could conceivably impact public lands. This interpretation
would extend beyond existing precedents. Although not all cases have
involved inholdings, the Property Clause has not been used to regulate
activities far from the federal lands.' Moreover, political ramifications
are likely to prevent courts from stretching the Property Clause to the
extreme.65
C. The Commerce Clause
An additional constitutional provision may justify regulations
regarding public lands, whether they are directed to activities on or off
the public lands. The Commerce Clause gives Congress authority over
matters in, or affecting, interstate commerce.66 For example, the
Commerce Clause has supported federal hydropower licenses issued in
contravention of state law.67 Therefore, if a court finds that a regulation
is not "needful" or sufficiently "respecting" federal property to come
within the Property Clause, the court may use the wide-ranging
Commerce Clause to bolster congressional authority.
68
The Commerce Clause has been used directly for legislation that
protects public lands or impacts development of publicly owned
resources, without a court first finding that the Property Clause was
insufficient to justify the statute. The Commerce Clause is the authority
for the Clean Air Act.69 This act regulates in respect to public lands
64. Mansfield, supra note 33, at 54-56. But see infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text
(discussing use of the Commerce Power).
65. Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 15; Sally K. Fairfax, Old Recipes for New Federalism, 12
ENVTL. L. 945,973-78 (1982).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress has the power "to regulate Commerce... among the
several States .... " Id.
67. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 182 (1946).
68. COGGINS, supra note 23, §3.03[4][b][i] at 3-23 (claiming it is "futile" to challenge legislation
affecting federal lands and resources based on lack of congressional power because of the force of
the Commerce Clause together with the broad Property Clause). Examples of the Commerce
Clause's practically unbounded breadth abound. See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 324
(1981) (stating the pertinent inquiry as not the amount of commerce involved but whether Congress
could rationally conclude the activity affected interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S.
111 (1942); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). See also Donald N.
Zillman, Natural Resources Federalism, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 1.01, § 1.02(l)(2) at 1-7 to
1-9 (1989) (describing the Rehnquist position that requires serious review of congressional assertion
of authority as a distinct minority).
69. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
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because it requires greater controls for sources of air pollution, regardless
of their location, if those sources have emissions that interfere with
visibility on certain types of federal lands."0 Similarly, the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act7 is authorized under the
Commerce Clause,72 and dictates measures for the development of
federal coal.73 Therefore, the Commerce Clause is not only a potential,
but an existing, source for public land regulation.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION
The sources of federal authority for regulating activities on or
affecting public lands have been detailed above. Unlike the federal
government, which is one of enumerated powers, states have a general
police power, which enables them to legislate for the general welfare and
safety of their citizens. State and federal spheres of influence sometimes
overlap, making choice of law an issue. Within enclaves, the search for
applicable law begins with the presumption that federal law is exclusive;
state law will operate only if there is a reservation of jurisdiction,
assimilation by statute, or sovereignty transfer. On non-enclave public
lands, the interpretive process is reversed. State law operates unless
federal usurpation exists. In that case, federal law may preempt
generally applicable state law.
A. Framework for Preemption Analysis
The doctrine of preemption is based in the Supremacy Clause, which
requires state law to yield to federal.74 Preemptive federal law may be
either statutes or agency regulations promulgated pursuant to valid
statutory authority.75 Whether or not a particular law or regulation
preempts state law is ultimately a question of congressional intent, which
may be expressed in several ways.
70. Id. § 7491.
71. 30 U.S.C.A. § 1201-1328 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
72. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 324.
73. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1272(b), 1273, 1304.
74. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
75. See City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988). For example, National Park
Service regulations forbidding firearms could be enforced against a hunter complying with state law
despite the fact that Congress was silent about hunting in the park. United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d
817 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
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The first and easiest example of preemption arises when Congress
expressly states that it intends to preempt state law. Congress has done
this occasionally, such as in the Endangered Species Act.76 The Act
expressly voids state laws that prohibit what it allows or which permit
what the Act prohibits.77 Other acts, such as the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act,7 declare inconsistent state laws and regulations
void, but exclude more stringent land use and environmental regulations
and laws from the definition of "inconsistent."79 This type of preemption
provides a federal "floor" for regulation.
If Congress does not express its wishes as to preemption, there are two
other ways to determine whether state law is preempted:
First, when Congress intends federal law occupy a given field, state
law in that field is pre-empted. Second, even if Congress has not
occupied the field, state law is nevertheless pre-empted to the
extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when
compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when
the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.""0
It is these latter manners of preemption, sometimes referred to as implied
preemption, that create the greatest controversy.81
B. Preemption in Public Land Cases
At one point, some scholars and lawyers questioned whether law
enacted under the Property Clause could be preemptive. Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 2 however, laid that argument to rest: "A different rule [i.e., one
which gave preeminence to state law] would place the public domain at
76. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
77. Id. § 1535(f).
78. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
79. Id. § 1255.
80. California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (citations omitted).
81. The related issue of governmental immunities no longer has much force in public land law
because, although states cannot directly tax federal facilities, the Supreme Court has allowed indirect
taxation. See United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977); see also COGGINS, supra note
23, § 402.4. Recently, the Tenth Amendment shows signs of being a limit on congressional
ingenuity. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (ruling that "take title" provisions
of federal low-level radioactive waste law violate the Tenth Amendment by coercing states to
regulate in a certain manner).
82. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
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the mercy of state legislation."83  The question, therefore, is whether
Congress intends to preempt state law when it acts pursuant to any of its
powers.
Direct language, one method of expressing such intent, is infrequently
encountered in public land legislation. Congress does address
preemption or federal-state relationships, but it often creates more
questions than it answers. The Federal Land Policy and Management
Act ("FLPMA"),8 the organic act for the BLM, provides several
examples. In Section 701, it states that "[n]othing in this Act shall be
construed as . . . expanding . . . or diminishing . . . Federal or State
jurisdiction . . . in water resources development or control. '85  This
provision does not clarify the respective spheres of the two jurisdictions.
In another section, Congress directs the BLM to specify conditions for
rights-of-way, but also requires compliance with two sets of state
standards: "applicable air and water quality standards established by or
pursuant to applicable . . . State law '8 6 and state standards on
environmental and safety matters "if those standards are more stringent
than applicable Federal standards."87  Obviously, these formulations
create new questions, namely what laws are "applicable" and what
standards are more stringent.88 At another point in FLPMA, Congress
requires BLM planning to be consistent with state and local land use
plans, but only to the extent that federal purposes are not thwarted.89
These last two express provisions on federal-state relationships only give
guidance on congressional priorities, whereas express preemption would
clearly mandate that federal law prevail.
83. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543 (quoting Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 526 (1897)).
84. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1784 (vest 1986 & Supp. 1993).
85. Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 701(g), 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.A.
§ 1701 note (West 1986)) (Savings Provisions (g)(2)). See also Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C.A.
§ 315n (West 1986) (stating that nothing in it should restrict a state's police regulation or police
power, but also stating that "nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting or restricting the
power and authority of the United States").
86. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1765(a)(iii).
87. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1765(a)(iv).
88. See Montana v. Johnson, 738 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1984) (ruling that a state requirement
of "minimum adverse environmental impact" is too vague to be an "applicable standard" under
FLPMA); Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 603-05 (9th Cir.
1981) (noting that a federal agency must comply with substance of state law, not procedure).
89. "Land use plans of the Secretary ... shall be consistent with State and local plans to the
maximum extent he finds consistent with Federal Law and the purposes of this Act." 43 U.S.C.A.
§ 1712(9) (West 1986).
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Implied preemption does arise in the public lands sphere. The first
type of implied preemption occurs when state law directly conflicts with
federal law on federal land, making compliance with both impossible. In
some early cases, state law authorized what the federal law prohibited.
For example, in Light v. United States,9' the federal government
prohibited grazing without a federal permit, but state law impliedly
allowed such grazing because it required a landowner to "fence-out"
cattle if the landowner wanted to prevent grazing. Similarly, in Kleppe v.
New Mexico,9 wild horses and burros were to be rounded up and
slaughtered pursuant to New Mexico law while the federal law protected
the animals from harassment and killing.92 Occasionally, the flip-side of
this type of preemption exists; pursuant to federal law: the United States
will be able to do something in contravention of state law.93 Implied
preemption by direct conflict, therefore, does affect who may regulate
public lands.
Another type of implied preemption takes place when state law
becomes an obstacle to federal purposes. This situation had not been
frequently litigated in the past, partly because the states did not heavily
regulate private activities on federal lands before the environmental
decade of the 1970s.94 As states began to assert jurisdiction over mining
and oil and gas drilling, conflicts arose. Central to these state court cases
was the question of whether the state regulation interfered with federal
purposes. Additionally, the cases addressed another implied preemption
issue, whether Congress had "occupied the field" so as to preclude state
regulation.
The first of these state court cases involved Idaho's regulation of
mining activities on unpatented mining claims. Idaho demanded a
permit for dredging activities and the miners responded that federal law
preempted the state requirement. In State ex rel. Andrus v. Click,5 the
90. 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
91. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
92. Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1340 (West 1985).
93. See Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928) (U.S. has the authority to kill deer out of season
despite state game laws); First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946) (U.S. has the
power to build dams despite state permit requirements). See also, California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490
(1990) (holding that federal power laws preempt California requirements for minimum stream
flows).
94. An earlier example was whether a state force-pooling statute could impact a federal oil and
gas lease. The court found it could, but the district court decision emphasized that the federal agency
consented to the pooling proposal. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 277 F. Supp.
366,370 (W.D. Okla. 1967), aft'd, 406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 829 (1969).
95. 554 P.2d 969 (Idaho 1976).
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court found that the Mining Law of 187296 did not preempt the state
environmental regulation for several reasons. First, the Mining Law
anticipated importing state law for matters such as requirements for
locating a valid mining claim. Second, the federal government had not
regulated mining pervasively despite the then recent Forest Service
regulations; the field was therefore not occupied. Finally, the court noted
that environmental regulation was a traditional state function.97
Nevertheless, the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged that there was a
boundary: a state could regulate, but not prohibit federally permitted
activity.98 A similar result was reached in Oregon a year later.99
The next major preemption case arose in California. Instead of an
unpatented mining claim, Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp. 100 involved
an oil and gas lease in a National Forest. The federal lessee had received
permission to drill from the relevant federal authorities, but Ventura
County sought to stop the drilling unless the lessee obtained a permit
under the county's zoning ordinance. The Ninth Circuit found that the
Mineral Leasing Act' required both lease stipulations and a permitting
regime that took into account environmental and technical
considerations. These federal regulatory activities, coupled with Forest
Service requirements and the fact that local concerns could be
communicated through National Environmental Policy Act proceedings,
showed that the federal government had occupied the field. Despite a
reluctance to find preemption of the state's historic police power, the
court found the zoning requirement would interfere with congressional
purposes and objectives."02 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit without opinion." 3
Ventura County is distinguishable from earlier cases based on the
historical distinction between the level of federal regulation under the
Mining Law of 1872 and under the Mineral Leasing Act. Under the
Mineral Leasing Act, the federal lessee was required to obtain not only a
specific lease, but an individualized permit to drill."° The venerable
96. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 21-54 (West 1986).
97. Andrus, 554 P.2d at 976.
98. Id.
99. State ex rel. Cox v. Hibbard, 570 P.2d 1190 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
100. 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
101. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-287 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
102. Ventura County, 601 F.2d at 1086.
103. 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
104. See generally Maria E. Mansfield, Through the Forest of the Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing
Controversy Toward a Paradigm of Meaningful NEPA Compliance, 24 LAND & WATER L. REv. 85,
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Mining Law makes no mention of environmental concerns and
frequently refers to state law. Moreover, not until the 1970s did either
the Forest Service'05 or the BLM' actively regulate mining on
unpatented mining claims.
Ventura County, however, was a very broad ruling: it found state law
facially preempted. The court did not inquire into whether the conditions
the county put on drilling were unreasonable because the lessee sought
no permit and the county drafted no conditions. The Ninth Circuit found
the local law objectionable because it was open-ended about what type of
conditions could be applied: "The federal Government has authorized a
specific use of federal lands, and Ventura cannot prohibit that use, either
temporarily or permanently, in an attempt to substitute its judgment for
that of Congress."' °7  The ruling in Ventura County would appear to
make any dual regulatory system or permit requirement automatically
preempted.
This prohibitory reading has not been adopted in subsequent cases.
State court decisions after Ventura County continued the earlier
dichotomy, allowing states to regulate private activities on federal lands
for environmental purposes, but not allowing them to prohibit activity.
For example, unpatented mining claims were again at issue in Brubaker
v. Board of County Commissioners. "8 The Forest Service had approved
an exploration plan, but the county denied the miner a permit required by
county zoning laws. The Colorado Supreme Court did not find
reasonable regulation was foreclosed, but did hold that preemption
prevented the county from prohibiting an activity authorized by federal
law.109
The Wyoming Supreme Court also found no preemption of reasonable
regulation of environmental impacts of mineral development on federal
lands. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Commission,"' a federal
oil and gas lessee had been granted permission both to drill and to use a
92-98 (1989) (describing the government's ability to consider the environment both prior to
exercising its discretion to grant a lease and after granting the lease).
105. See regulations at 36 C.F.R. § 228 (1992); United States v. Weiss, 642 F.2d 296 (9th Cir.
1981) (authorizing regulations).
106. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3802,3809 (1992).
107. Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1084, (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 445 U.S. 947
(1980).
108. 652 P.2d 1050 (Colo. 1982).
109. Id. at 1059.
110. 693 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1985).
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specific access route after review by the BLM and Forest Service. The
Wyoming Oil and Gas Commission, however, would approve the drilling
only if the operator employed one of the alternative access routes the
federal agencies had analyzed; the Commission determined that the
chosen route would create unacceptable damage that would not be
amenable to reclamation.' On review, the court held that the federal
approvals and laws did not preempt state action because states
traditionally are concerned with environmental impacts and the Mineral
Leasing Act preserved state input. Its ruling foreshadowed a new
dichotomy for preemption analysis:
In contrast to the zoning ordinances at issue in Ventura County and
Brubaker, mining permit requirements designed to safeguard the
environment have received favorable treatment in the courts. These
latter regulations constitute legitimate means of guiding mineral
development without prohibiting it."
2
The Wyoming court treated environmental regulations differently than
zoning actions.
The Supreme Court embraced the dichotomy between environmental
law and zoning only two years later. In 1987, it heard the challenge of
the Granite Rock Company to the attempted state regulation of its
unpatented mining claims."' The Forest Service had approved Granite
Rock's mining plan, but the California Coastal Commission demanded
that the company seek a permit from it. Granite Rock immediately sued,
claiming that federal law would preempt any and all possible permit
conditions in light of the Forest Service review. The Supreme Court first
rejected the argument that the General Mining Law statute and agency
regulations "occupied the field" because the regulations themselves
referred to obtaining necessary state permits and complying with state
law." 4 More importantly, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
characterized the Coastal Commission's permit requirement as
environmental regulation:
The line between environmental regulation and land use planning
will not always be bright; for example, one may hypothesize a state
environmental regulation so severe that a particular land use would
become commercially impracticable. However, the core activity
111. Id. at 231-32.
112. Id. at 237.
113. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
114. Id. at 583.
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described by each phrase is undoubtedly different. Land use
planning in essence chooses particular uses for the land;
environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate particular
uses of the land but requires only that, however the land is used,
damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits."s
There was no way to judge if the conditions to b. imposed would
conflict with any federal purpose, because this was a facial challenge to
the Coastal Commission's authority. Under Granite Rock, the permitting
requirement itself was not preempted, but individual actions under the
authority potentially were.
Granite Rock appears to recognize the previous dichotomy that a state
may regulate but not prohibit federally permitted a-ivities, but also
seems to be adding a distinction between land use planning and
environmental regulation.'16 However, because the case is based on
readings of specific statutes and specific regulations, it is difficult to
make generalizations. It also was a 5-4 decision, with strong dissents by
Justices Scalia. 7 and Powell."' Nevertheless, those desiring to develop
public lands may care less about the theory of the law than about what
practically happens to their proposals. Most often, federal employees,
under principles of comity, seek the input of state and local officials
before approving development." 9  Only if these officials become
overbearing will the federal government join developers in a preemption
claim. The problems of regulation by multiple levels of government,
however, may negatively impact on development through delay and
increased costs. 20
115. Id. at 587.
116. Various commentators have written on the case. See, e.g., Theodore E. Worcester, Land Use
Planning and Regulation after Granite Rock: State and Local Control of Operations on Federal
Lands, 36 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 19-1 (1990); John D. Leshy, Grante Rock and the States'
Influence Over Federal Land Use, 18 ENVTL. L. 99 (1987); Eric T. Freyfogle, Federal Lands and
Local Communities, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 653 (1985).
117. Granite Rock 480 U.S. at 607-614 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state regulation
was directed to land use control rather than environmental regulation).
118. Id. at 604-06. (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state regulation creates a dual permit
system which unacceptably intrudes on federal authority).
119. See Richard H. Cowart & Sally K. Fairfax, Public Lands Federalism: Judicial Theory and
Administrative Reality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 375, 408-39 (1988).
120. Parallel problems exist in the state system. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court found
the state's Oil and Gas Conservation Act did not totally preempt regulation by home-rule cities and
counties if such regulation does not conflict in operation with statewide interests. In Board of
Commissioners v. Bowen-Edwards Associates, Inc., 630 P.2d 1045, 1059 (Colo. 1992), the Court
refused to find that the Oil and Gas Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over all aspects of oil and
gas drilling. Under statutes empowering local governments to regulate land use and develop zoning
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IV. WITHDRAWALS, RESERVATIONS, AND CLASSIFICATIONS
Initially, the "public domain" label was applied to all federally-owned
lands that were acquired by treaty from other nations, including Native
Americans, or ceded to the federal government by the thirteen original
states.'21 A secondary meaning, however, was that the "public domain"
or "public lands" encompassed lands "subject to sale or other disposal
under general laws."'" As the Supreme Court phrased it, traditional
public land laws were statutes "governing the alienation of public
land."'" If the lands were open to these laws, individuals and states
could deprive the federal government of the lands and resources by
operation of such laws. As a result, either Congress or the executive
periodically either "reserved" or "withdrew" lands. 24 From these actions
came the diverse land management systems of modem public land
management.
These two types of actions historically had different meanings. A
"withdrawal" merely removed lands or resources from disposition, while
a "reservation" committed the federal lands to a specific purpose.
Although the difference may seem purely theoretical, "reserved" water
rights might attach only to lands that have been "reserved," and not to
those withdrawn." These rights arise when water is necessary to fulfill
for unincorporated territories, the county could require a permit for drilling, provided the conditions
imposed do not conflict with the state's interest. Id. at 1059-60. The case was remanded to create a
record of the operational impact of the County's regulation. Id. In a similar case, the Colorado
Supreme Court upheld the authority of home-rle cities to consider the land use impacts of oil and
gas drilling, but found that an outright ban on drilling within the city limits was preempted by the
state's need to regulate drillsite locations. Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992).
121. Cf. Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 (1900). This would contrast with acquired lands, which
had been owned by private parties or the states. Disposition systems may differ for acquired lands.
See, e.g., Acquired Lands Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 351-359 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993). For
management under FLPMA, the distinction is abolished; "public lands" means "any land and interest
in land owned by the United States... and administered by the... Bureau of Land Management,
without regard to how the United States acquired ownership" except lands held for Native
Americans and on the Outer Continental Shelf. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(e) (West 1986).
122. Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763 (1875).
123. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 19 (1965). By 1934, most dispositions of land, as opposed to
resources such as minerals, had slowed. See discussion infra at notes 148-51.
124. See generally COGGINS, supra note 23, Chapter 9; David H. Getches, Managing the Public
Lands: The Authority of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279 (1982);
Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., Withdrawals Under the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, 21
ARIZ. L. REv. 311 (1979).
125. See generally COGGINS, supra note 23, § 4.04.
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the purposes for which lands have been set aside. 126 Because the rights
have a priority dating to the time of the reservation even if the waters
were not put to beneficial use at that date, they are important in states
following the law of appropriation.
In addition to withdrawals and reservations, a third activity provided a
final technique to zone the public domain. When an agency "classifies"
lands, it assigns a particular tract of land to a specific function.
Generally, specific statutes required classifications. The law governing
these three tools falls into two eras: before and after the passage of
FLPMA.
A. Pre-FLPMA Law: Specialized Areas, Withdrawals, and
Classifications
Before the passage of FLPMA, the government made both
reservations and withdrawals under various statutory and non-statutory
authorities. Reservations, coupled with withdrawals, created some of our
nation's diverse land management systems. In addition to Indian
reservations127 and military forts,'28 reservation authority created forest
reserves and other specialized areas.
The history of most of these land systems show the influence of both
congressional and executive action. National Forests were initially set
aside under executive authority pursuant to the Forest Reserve
Amendment of 1891.129 Congress largely repealed this authority in
1907,"30 but not before the executive had reserved most of the lands
currently in the National Forest.' The National Wildlife Refuge System
also began with executive action. In 1903, President Roosevelt declared
126. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963).
127. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 470 (1915) (noting that prior to 1910,
99 executive orders established or enlarged Indian reservations).
128. Executive reservations were arguably made by the President as Commander in Chief of the
military. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. In 1958, Congress placed limits on the implied authority of the
executive to make withdrawals for military use. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 155-158 (West 1986) (as amended).
129. The President could reserve "any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered with
timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not." Act of Marzh 3, 1891 Ch. 561 § 24,
26 Stat. 1103, repealed by FLPMA, Pub. L. No. 94-579, Title VII § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976).
130. Act of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1271 (repealing authority in most of the western
states).
131. See generally James L. Huffiman, A History of Forest Policy in the United States, 8 ENVTL.
L. 239 (1978).
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that Pelican Island would be a Federal Bird Reservation.'32 Congress
also established refuges, as it did National Forests. In the case of
National Parks, however, there was no dual authority. Congress, rather
than the executive, made each reservation with special legislation
establishing each park.'
The executive could, however, initially reserve one component of the
National Park System, specifically, National Monuments, under the
Antiquities Act of 1906' 4 The Antiquities Act of 1906 enables the
president:
[T]o declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic
and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific
interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the
Government... to be national monuments, and may reserve as a
part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases shall be
confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and
management of the objects to be protected.3 5
The wording of the Act does not accurately reflect its actual application.
Although its drafters anticipated it would be used to protect Indian ruins
in the southwest from plunder and vandalism, and its first use was to
reserve the modest Devil's Tower National Monument in Wyoming, the
executive has used the Antiquities Act to withdraw and reserve large
areas such as Grand Canyon National Monument'36 and Jackson Hole
National Monument.'37 Both these areas later became National Parks.
Moreover, in 1978, President Carter used the Antiquities Act, which was
not repealed by FLPMA, to protect 56 million acres in Alaska pending
congressional action.'38 In interpreting what water rights were reserved
for the benefit of monuments, however, some courts have hued more
closely to this statute's wording than courts have in examining the
appropriate size of monuments. 39
132. See COGGINS, supra note 23, § 2.03[2][c].
133. See, for example, the first such act, the Yellowstone Park Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 32 (codified
at 16 U.S.C.A. § 21 (West 1992).
134. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-433 (West 1993).
135. Id. § 431 (emphasis added).
136. See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450,455 (1920).
137. See Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D. Wyo. 1945).
138. See Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853 (D. Alaska 1980);
Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Alaska 1978).
139. United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 27-29 (Colo. 1982) (noting that the
Dinosaur National Monument's purpose was to preserve bones; it did not have the same recreational
and aesthetic purposes as parks). National Monuments, however, are subject to management
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In addition to exercising the express authority to reserve federal lands,
the executive also withdrew federal lands. That is, it removed the lands
from the operation of public land laws and the mining law. These
withdrawals variously were or were not also designed to "reserve"
federal lands for specific purposes. Theoretically, many of these
withdrawals were to be temporary and the executive justified them as an
aid to prospective congressional action. In one of the more celebrated
withdrawals, President Taft in 1909 withdrew over three million acres in
California and Wyoming classified as valuable for oil from all types of
entry; he was concerned the lands would pass into private ownership and
the United States would have to buy back the oil for the Navy. In United
States v. Midwest Oil Company,4' the Supreme Court upheld the
withdrawal as part of the "implied" powers of the President existing
when Congress has not acted under the Property Clause.
The Supreme Court in Midwest Oil reviewed prior presidential
reservations for wildlife refuges and military forts, which were done
without express congressional authority, as well as repeated withdrawals
of lands. To the Court, the power to make reservations must include the
lesser power to make a withdrawal."' More importantly, Congress was
aware of both types of actions and this knowledge bolstered executive
authority: "[Congress's] silence was acquiescence. Its acquiescence was
equivalent to consent to continue the practice until the power was
revoked by some subsequent action by Congress."142
Congress did directly respond to some of the concerns unrestrained
access to the public domain engendered. For example, it addressed the
problem that provoked President Taft's withdrawal, namely the fear that
oil could be the basis of a mining claim under the Mining Law of 1872
and pass into private ownership. Congress passed the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920,43 which created a withdrawal of another sort. The Act
"withdrew" oil, gas, and certain other minerals from disposition under
the Mining Law and put them under the control of the executive through
the leasing system."4 Before passing the Mineral Leasing Act, Congress
pursuant to the Park Service Organic Act, which emphasizes recreation ard preservation. See infra
notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
140. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
141. Id. at476.
142. Id. at 481. Congress did act in FLPMA to repeal the inherent authority.
143. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 86,41 Stat. 451.
144. 30 U.S.C.A. § 193 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
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also increased administrative control by giving the executive express
authority for withdrawals in the 1910 Pickett Act,145 which broadly
referred to withdrawals and reservations of public lands for any "public
purposes.1 146 Nevertheless, the Act had an important limitation: "All
lands withdrawn under the provisions of this Act shall at all times be
open to exploration, discovery, occupation, and purchase under, the
mining laws of the United States, so far as the same apply to minerals
other than coal, oil, gas, and phosphates .... , Withdrawals under this
act could not impact availability of land for hard rock mining for
metalliferous minerals.
The Pickett Act, therefore, provided express authority for
withdrawals. It also placed limits on such activities, however, which
gave rise to the question of whether any implied authority remained
under the Midwest Oil analysis. In 1941, after first concluding the
opposite, the Attorney General issued an opinion stating that the
President did retain implied authority in addition to the express statutory
authority. Under the implied authority, withdrawals from the operation
of the mining law were possible. 14' A federal district court agreed,
relying not only on the Attorney General's opinion but also on two
additional factors.149 First, Congress mentioned implied authority in the
legislative history of an act dealing with military reservations.
Additionally, Congress was aware of the withdrawal in question and thus
"acquiesced" in the action.5' Therefore, when FLPMA was passed, the
President had both express and implied authority to reserve and withdraw
public lands.1 ' Although the Pickett Act expressly authorized
"temporary" withdrawals and was subsequently repealed, its terms are
still important because withdrawals under it are still in existence.
145. Pickett Act of 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847-48, repealed by FLPMA, Pub. L. No. 94-579,
Title VII § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976).
146. Id. § 1.
147. Id. § 2.
148. 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 73 (1941).
149. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F. Supp. 859, 862 (D. Wyo. 1977).
150. Id.
151. Procedurally, the President delegated this authority to the Secretary of Interior in 1952.
Withdrawals were then made by formal "Public Land Order' published in the Federal Register. See
COGGINS, supra note 23, § 9.03[2][a]. This procedure distinguishes a withdrawal from less formal
management decisions to refrain from engaging in certain resource activities. Burglin v. Morton,
527 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976) (withholding lands from
mineral leasing is not a withdrawal but an exercise of discretion under the Mineral Leasing Act); see
also infra note 163 (discussing cases considering whether a refusal to lease for oil and gas was a
withdrawal of lands from the operation of the Mineral Leasing Act).
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Withdrawals under the Pickett Act were to remain effective until revoked
by the President or Congress. 52
In addition to land management through withdrawals and reservations,
classifications had long been a part of public land law. The first
classifications made determined whether lands were or were not "mineral
in character;" nineteenth century land disposition acts often specified that
only non-mineral land could be granted.5 3 Therefore, the classifications
affected land use.
Two twentieth century laws also granted classification powers. The
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 4 modified the prior focus of traditional
public land law on dispositions. At one point the Act stated that its
directions were to last "pending disposal" of the lands, but the Act
nevertheless authorized withdrawal of the remaining unclaimed federal
land. In managing the withdrawn lands,' the Secretary of Interior was
to:
examine and classify lands.., which are more valuable or suitable
for the production of agricultural crops than for the production of
native grasses and forage plants, or more valuable or suitable for
any other use than for the use provided for under this subchapter, or
proper for acquisition in satisfaction of any outstanding lieu,
exchange or script [sic] rights or land grant, and to open such lands
to entry, selection, or location for disposal in accordance with such
classification under applicable public-land laws .... '
These classifications did not impact the availability of land under the
mineral laws, but the Secretary had broad authority to classify land for
specific types of dispositions or to leave land unclassified. If the
Secretary remained true to congressional purposes, courts would uphold
discretionary calls.'57
152. Pickett Act of 1910, ch. 421, § 1, 37 Stat. 847, repealed by FLPMA, Pub. L. No. 94-579,
Title VII § 702, 89 Stat. 2792 (1976).
153. See, e.g., Act of June 21, 1866, ch. 227 § 1, 14 Stat. 67 ("Mineral lands shall not be liable to
entry and settlement under the provisions of [the Homestead Acts]."), repealed by FLPMA, Pub. L.
No. 94-579, Title VII § 702, 90 Stat. 2792 (1976). See also United State3 v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563
(1918) (interpreting early state land grant laws to exclude mineral lands even if no express limitation
exists).
154. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 315-315o, 485, 1171 (West 1986) (as amended).
155. For ease of reference, these lands may be thought of as BLM lands, although the BLM was
not actually in existence until 1946. See infra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
156. 43 U.S.C.A. § 315f(West 1986).
157. Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 520 (1980) (upholding a regulation requiring lands not to be
of "grossly disparate value" for classification as state in lieu land).
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In 1964, Congress passed another act with broad impact, the
Classification and Multiple Use Act.158 Under it, the BLM lands were to
be classified as suitable for several purposes. Although the BLM merely
classified most lands as suitable for multiple use with no restrictions,
many of the classification orders segregated lands from the operation of
the mineral laws. FLPMA provides that all existing withdrawals,
reservations, and classifications would remain in effect until modified
under FLPMA procedures. 59 These orders have lingering effects as the
BLM reviews and considers revoking them.
B. FLPMA Authorities: Consolidation and Review
In 1976, Congress passed organic legislation for the BLM that greatly
modified the prior law of withdrawals, reservations, and classifications.
First, it repealed prior law, including the implied powers granted by the
Midwest Oil case. 60 Second, it removed the distinction between a
withdrawal and a reservation by including both in the statutory definition
of a "withdrawal."'' Third, it mandated specific procedures for future
withdrawals and required a review of existing withdrawals and
classifications.
FLPMA delegates prospective withdrawal authority directly to the
Secretary of Interior. Section 20462 provides detailed procedures,
including public participation, to govern exercise of this authority. 63
158. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1411-1418 (West 1986) (expired 1970). The Act was to expire
automatically when the Public Land Law Review Commission completed its report to Congress. See
PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW CONSI'N, supra note 1.
159. Pub. L. No. 94-579, Title VII § 701(c), 90 Stat. 2786 (1976). See National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1987), dismissed for lack of standing, sub nom. Lujan v.
National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
160. Pub. L. No. 94-579, Title VII. § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976) ("[Tihe implied authority of the
President to make withdrawals and reservations resulting from the acquiescence of the Congress
(U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co .... ) [is] repealed.").
161. FLPMA states:
The term 'withdrawal' means withholding an area of Federal land from settlement, sale,
location, or entry, under some or all of the general land laws, for the purpose of limiting
activities under those laws in order to maintain other public values in the area or reserving the
area for a particular public purpose or program; or transferring jurisdiction over an area of
federal land ... from one department, bureau, or agency to another department, bureau or
agency.
43 U.S.C.A. § 1702G) (West 1988).
162. Codified as 43 U.S.C.A. § 1714 (West 1986).
163. See generally COGGINS, supra note 23, § 9.03; Getches, supra note 124; Wheatley, supra
note 124. Given this detail, a question then arises as to whether the BLM by inaction may make the
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Congress has no oversight role for withdrawals of less than 5,000 acres.
For withdrawals of more than this acreage, however, FLPMA requires
the Secretary to submit the withdrawal to Congress, providing an
opportunity for either house to veto the proposal."6 The Supreme Court
has found one-house vetoes violative of bicaneralism and the
Presentment Clause in other settings.165 It is unclear whether or not this
provision of FLPMA is subject to the same infirmity. Further, even if
the submission provision is unconstitutional, it is a separate question
whether the congressional veto provisions are severable from secretarial
authority to make withdrawals of more than 5,000 acres. If the
provisions are severable, the Secretary can make withdrawals without
supervision; if not, the Secretary could make no withdrawals over 5,000
acres.
166
Another provision in FLPMA allows a congressional committee to
direct the Secretary to make an emergency withdrawal. 67 This power
may similarly run afoul of bicameralism, although a directive differs
from a veto. Cases to date have not definitively answered whether the
one committee power is unconstitutional. 6 Regardless of this issue, the
Secretary does have independent power to make a withdrawal for up to
three years of any amount of land in cases of emergency.' 69 The
functional equivalent of a withdrawal. Two Wyoming district court cases said the failure to process
oil and gas lease applications was a de facto withdrawal and invalid because it did not follow the
FLPMA procedures. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980);
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 668 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Wyo. 1987). This analysis has been
rejected by the Ninth Circuit and commentators because the Secretary traditionally has great
discretion on whether or not to lease. Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989); see Getches, supra note 124, at 296; COGGINS, supra note
23, § 9.03[3][e][ii].
164. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1714(c)(1) (West 1986).
165. ImmigratiQn and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (193).
166. Compare Robert L. Glicksman, Severability and Realignment of the Balance of Power Over
Public Lands: The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 After the Legislative Veto
Decisions, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 4,51 (1984) (arguing that the provision is severable if unconstitutional,
but it may not be unconstitutional because of plenary power under the Property Clause) with
COGGINS, supra note 23, § 9.03[3][c] (arguing that the veto provision is not severable because
Congress in FLPMA intended to reassert control).
167. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1714(e) (West 1986).
168. Pacific Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp 982, 1004 (D. Mont. 1981) (holding congressional
withdrawal directive not infirm because Secretary determines length of withdrawal); National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding the withdrawal provision
unconstitutional, but the Secretary is bound by the duly promulgated regulation stating that
withdrawal would be made).
169. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1714(e).
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Secretary has used this authority to withdraw millions of acres in
Alaska. 17
0
In addition to delineating procedures for future withdrawals, Congress
also required the BLM to review existing withdrawals in the western
states that affected the availability of lands for mineral development.171
This review was to be completed by 1991 ." The statute envisioned
"termination" of withdrawals and other orders that were no longer
serving their purposes, and recommendations to continue others. Both
were to be proceeded by reports to the President and Congress. 73 In
order to avoid these lengthy procedures when existing restrictions
thwarted management decisions, the BLM utilized another section of
FLPMA, which provided for authority to "make, modify, extend or
revoke withdrawals." 74 If the examination of the current need for a
withdrawal arose in the ordinary course of business and not as part of the
general review, the BLM purported to "revoke" it rather than using the
detailed procedures for "terminations. 1 75  The National Wildlife
Federation challenged this habit, as well as other aspects of the BLM's
opening of previously closed lands. In National Wildlife Federation v.
Burford,176 the court of appeals found that the BLM substantively
violated the complex commands of FLPMA. Although the case was
dismissed by the Supreme Court because the plaintiffs lacked standing,
the lower court decision illuminates acceptable FLPMA process. The
court considered the public participation and planning requirements to be
serious limitations on agency action.
FLPMA does contain extensive provisions on withdrawals, but, in
contrast, it does not give the BLM any authority to "classify" lands per
se. The only reference to the term "classifications" is in the section
dealing with land use planning:
170. See Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Alaska 1978).
171. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1714(1) (West 1986) (excepting congressional withdrawals and reservations).
172. Current estimates are for completion by 1998. PuBLIC LAND NEWS, April 16, 1992 at 5.
173. The statute also allows for congressional disapproval of a recommendation by concurrent
resolution. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1714()(2).
174. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1714(a) (West 1986).
175. To a certain extent, Congress confirmed that the BLM should have some day-to-day ability
to modify and revoke classifications as well as withdrawals. During the pendency of the litigation
that culminated in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, Congress gave temporary authority for the
BLM to modify, terminate, or revoke withdrawals and classifications that interfered with exchanges
of lands. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1723 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (expired December 31, 1990).
176. 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), dismissed for lack of standing, sub nom. Lujan v. National
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
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Any classification of public lands or any land use plan in effect on
October 21, 1976, is subject to review in the land use planning
process ... and all public lands, regardless of classification, are
subject to inclusion in any land use plan developed pursuant to this
section. The Secretary may modify or terminate any such
classification consistent with such land use plans. 77
The BLM has modified and terminated classifications, however, outside
the formal land use planning process. 7
Although the above excerpt is the only reference to classifications,
FLPMA does address "management decisions."1 9  Management
decisions may implement land use plans and may exclude "principal or
major uses" from BLM-managed public lands."' The BLM cannot close
an area to the Mining Law of 1872 or transfer land to another agency,
however, without a formal withdrawal.' 1 Moreover, exclusions of one
or more of the "principal or major uses" for more than two years on a
tract exceeding 100,000 acres must be reported to Congress.' 2 In
practice, therefore, management decisions and land-use planning under
FLPMA apparently supplant the formal classifications of prior laws.
In summary, FLPMA greatly consolidated prior withdrawal and
reservation practice. Additionally, it required openness in the process.
Further, FLPMA attempted to provide congressional oversight for major
decisions, including both extensive withdrawals and exclusionary
management decisions, which affect the availability of public lands for
different purposes.
177. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1712(d) (West 1986).
178. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), dismissed for lack of
standing, sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); 43 U.S.C.A. § 1723
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (expired December 31, 1990).
179. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1712(e) (West 1986).
180. Principal or major uses are "domestic livestock grazing, fish and wildlife development and
utilization, mineral exploration and production, rights-of-way, outdoor recreation, and timber
production." 43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(1) (West 1986); compare this with the six purposes for which
Forest Service lands are to be managed: outdoor recreation, range, timbe; watershed, wildlife and
fish, and wilderness. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(e)(1) (West 1985).
181. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1712(e)(3).
182. The familiar, and questionable, procedure for congressional disapproval by concurrent
resolutions also appears. See id. § 1712(e)(2).
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V. STATUTORY MANDATES FOR THE MAJOR LAND
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Diverse land systems are included in the broader definition of "public
lands" with which this article began. Statutory guidance for management
of these lands varies. Three types of governing statutes are possible.
The first type is a single purpose statute that clearly points to one
management result. For example, the Endangered Species Act, which
applies to all land-managing agencies, forbids actions that are "likely to
jeopardize" the continued existence of threatened or endangered species
or to adversely modify their critical habitat.t 3 The second type is a
statute that lists various goals, and either imbues the agency with free
discretion to choose among them or provides so many considerations that
no effective guidance is given.' These statutes are often referred to as
"thematic" statutes.' The final type is a statute that moderates between
these two extremes. This type grants an agency discretion, but provides
specific direction in case of conflict. When faced with competing values,
the agency is to give one value greater consideration than other
conflicting values. Congress has used all these types of statutes in the
public land arena. As Section VI discusses, the dialogue in the public
lands arena generally contrasts "multiple use" with "dominant use"
mandates.
183. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993). See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978) (noting that Congress found species preservation outweighed other agency
objectives). Exemptions are possible in limited circumstances. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h) (West 1985
& Supp. 1993).
184. As Professor Stewart put it, there are two sources of discretion: Congress could freely
"endow an agency with plenary responsibilities" and allow the agency full discretion, or it could
"issue directives that are intended to control the agency's choice among alternatives but that, because
of their generality, ambiguity, or vagueness, do not clearly determine choices in particular cases."
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1669,
1676 n.25 (1975).
185. Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1505-07
(1983) (describing such statutes as listing "considerations" but giving no weighing factors). See also
James H. Henderson & Richard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The
Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1429, 1430 (1978) (calling such statutes
"aspirational"). These statutes differ from "agency-forcing" statutes, which direct policy in a certain
direction but require an agency to use its expertise in a careful policy appraisal before the
congressional initiative becomes a regulation and thus law. Bruce A. Ackerman & William T.
Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1556-66 (1980).
An example of such a statute would be the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30
U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (especially §§ 1258, 1260, and 1265).
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A. BLM and the "Public Lands"
As noted above, 8 6 the BLM, an agency of the Department of Interior,
manages that portion of the "public domain" which has not been reserved
for other purposes.187 Despite a general definition of BLM lands as those
not reserved, the BLM or its predecessor may have withdrawn or
reserved portions of these lands for specific managenent purposes. For
example, the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 directed the
Secretary to withdraw stock water holes and driveways under the Pickett
Act. 8' Since 1976, the term "public lands" has been statutorily applied
to all land and interests in lands the BLM manages.'89 The new
terminology reflects the change in the BLM's duties over time, a change
that corresponds with a revised appraisal of the resources it controls.
BLM's initial role arose from a merger between the General Land
Office and the Grazing Service in 1946.19 The BLM inherited these
agencies' preexisting focuses. The General Land Office had been
responsible for disposal of lands and resources under various homestead
laws, state land grants, and mineral laws.' 9 ' The Grazing Service
managed grazing districts under the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934
"pending disposal."' 92 The public often perceived the resulting agency as
an implement for private enterprise to receive its "rightful share" of the
public resources or lands.19 Congress moderated this emphasis by
186. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
187. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding no implied water rights for
BLM lands because they are the public domain and not reservations).
188. Stock-Raising Homestead Act, Pub. L. No. 290, ch. 9, § 10, 39 Stat. 865 (1916), repealed by
FLPMA, Pub. L. No. 94-579, Title VII § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792 (1976).
189. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(e) (West 1986). An earlier attempt to name the BLM-managed lands
employed the title "national resource lands."
190. See George C. Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland
Management I: The Commons and The TaylorAct, 13 ENvTL. L. 1, 54-68 (1982).
191. The General Land Office did not always meet the congressional goals of these acts. See
Sheldon L. Greene, Promised Land: A Contemporary Critique of Distribution of Public Land by the
United States, 5 ECOLoGY L.Q. 707, 750-51 (1976) (arguing that predat.ry economic interests of
large landholders and railroads perverted nineteenth century land laws from equitable distributive
goals and distorted 20th century reclamation law).
192. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 315-315r (West 1986). For a general review and indictment of the act as "an
anachronistic subsidy," see Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 190; see also NRDC v.
Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
193. For a summary of the major trends in statutory enactments, see George C. Coggins, The
Public Interest in Public Land Law: A Commentary on the Policies of Secrotary Watt, 4 PUB. LAND
L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1983) (noting accurately that a stage existed between land disposal and land
retention).
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passing the Multiple Use and Surface Protection Act of 1955,194 which
addressed the impacts of mining, and the Classification and Multiple Use
Act of 1964,' 9' which directed the agency to manage and classify lands
for different purposes. Nevertheless, the tenor of the BLM's mandate
needed fundamental and not piecemeal revision for it to respond as a
changing population made varying recreational and aesthetic demands on
resources. 
196
In 1976, FLPMA was Congress's attempt to establish the new status
of the agency. Although grazing and mineral functions remain strong
elements of its role,1 97 the Act for the first time acknowledges that the
BLM should do what its non-acronym title implies: it should be a land
manager. 98 Planning became a central function. The first policy enun-
ciated in the act emphasized this:
[T]he public lands [should] be retained in Federal ownership,
unless as a result of land use planning procedure provided for in
this Act, it is determined that the disposal of a particular parcel will
serve the national interest. 99
Public lands were perhaps no longer being held "pending disposal,"
despite the fact that the Taylor Grazing Act provision remains on the
books.
194. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 611-615 (West 1986). See infra, notes 209-11 and accompanying text. For
a general discussion of the increasing control of mining, see also California Coastal Commission v.
Granite Rock, 480 U.S. 572 (1987) and James N. Barkeley and Lawrence V. Albert, A Survey of
Case Law Interpreting "Valid Existing Rights" - Implications for Unpatented Mining Claims, 34
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 9-13 to 9-20 (1988) (noting that statutes caused a change in property
status of mining claims).
195. Pub. L. No. 88-607, §§ 1-8, 78 Stat. 986-88 (1964) (codified at43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1411-1418
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993), expired in 1970 pursuant to 43 U.S.C.A. § 1418 (West 1986)).
196. Marion Clawson, The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 in a Broad
Historical Perspective, 21 Aiz. L. REV. 585, 595 (1979) (describing FLPMA's origins in
demographic, economic, social, and political trends that brought a "larger total population, including
more older persons in retirement and more younger persons physically and ideologically active..
."). For criticisms identifying past and present problems as underfunding, political pressure, and
conflicting demands, see George C. Coggins et al., The Law of Public Rangeland Management I:
The Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535, 564 (1982), and Fairfax, supra
note 65, at 973.
197. See, e.g., Title IV codified at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1751-1753, 315b and 315j (West 1986)
(grazing amendments); 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(12) (West 1986) (manage to promote food and
mineral production); 43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(1) (West 1986) (major or principal uses include domestic
livestock grazing and mineral exploration and production). See also Public Rangelands
Improvement Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1908 (West 1986).
198. Cf NRDC v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (ruling that BLM may not abdicate
responsibility to set permit terms).
199. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(1) (West 1988).
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FLPMA embodies a truce in the battle to control the public lands."'
The truce was possible because FLPMA directed the BLM to consider
disparate values in furthering the "national interest" without demanding a
specific result. Congress did not order the BLM to favor resource use or
non-use.2"' Some, however, have identified a spirit of environmental
protection throughout the Act.20 2  Others argue the Act should not be
vie'ed as placing environmental protection over other aims.203
The diversity of views is fueled by both FLPMA's lack of an
overriding management goal, and the fact that other acts are operative
upon the public lands. FLPMA identifies the principal or major uses of
the BLM lands as "domestic livestock grazing, fish and wildlife
development and utilization, mineral exploration and production, rights-
of-way, outdoor recreation, and timber production."2 0 While some of
these uses are regulated under FLPMA,05 some are also subject to
independent statutes.
200. Clawson, supra note 196 (temporary lull in debates); Raymond A. Peck, Jr., "And Then
There Were None" Evolving Federal Restraints on the Availability of Public Lands for Mineral
Development, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 3-2, 3-14 (1979) (noting the debate between
developing or preserving and who should decide pre-dated Constitution).
201. See Maria E. Mansfield, The "Public" in Public Land Appeals: A Case Study in "Reformed"
Administrative Law and Proposalfor Orderly Participation, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 490-94
(1988); John A. Carver, Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976: Fruition or
Frustration, 54 DENV. L.J. 387, 408-09 (1977) (arguing that FLPMA's vagueness in land use
planning procedures does not carry out goal of increasing congressional control of land
management); Jerome C. Muys, The Public Land Law Review Commission 's Impact on the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 21 ARIZ. L. REv. 301, 306-07 (1979) (concluding that
FLPMA conferred more discretion than recommended and did not adopt dominant use principles of
PLLRC).
202. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980) aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (explaining that environmental goals in policy
section provide direction and duty to agency but means to goal discretionary); NRDC v. Hodel, 618
F. Supp. at 857-58 (implying that FLPMA gives environmental tinge to range duties). For
commentators emphasizing environmental mandate, see, e.g., Perry L. Hagenstein, Public Lands and
'Environmental Concerns, 21 ARIZ. L. REv. 449, 451 (1979), and George C. Coggins, The Law of
Public Rangeland Management lV: FLPMA, PRIA, and The Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENvTL. L. 1,
26-32 (1983).
203. Peck, supra note 200, at 3-13 (arguing that limiting development is counter to "national
policies and statutory mandates"); William R. Marsh & Don H. Sherwood, Metamorphosis in Mining
Law: Federal Legislative and Regulatory Amendment and Supplementation of the General Mining
Law Since 1955, 26 ROCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 209, 250-72 (1980) (concluding that despite some
conflicts, Congress required mineral independence).
204. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(1) (West 1986). Under the concept of multiple use management,
however, other uses may be considered. See infra notes 356-57 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Title V of FLPMA, which governs rights-of-way, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1761-1771 (West
1986). FLPMA also governs sales and exchanges of public lands and planning and administration.
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Several laws govern mineral development and exploration. Hardrock
minerals are obtained under the Mining Law of 1872.206 Rights under
this Act are primarily self-initiated: Lands are "free and open to
exploration and purchase."207  If a private person "discovered" a
"valuable mineral deposit," a claim could be "located" and worked
without further ado or, at the claimant's option, "patent" or fee title
sought.2 8 Despite this statutory regime, the Multiple Surface Use Act of
1955209 directs the BLM to manage non-mineral resources within the
boundaries of an unpatented mining claim. Although mining would still
be the primary use of the claim, the claimant's exclusive rights of
possession ended.10 Additionally, the miner must use reasonable means
of production or face an injunction; unnecessary destruction of surface
resources impedes the BLM's directive to manage the same.21' FLPMA
directly amended the Mining Law by expressly subjecting mining claims
to its command that "[i]n managing the public lands, the Secretary shall,
by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent
206. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 21-42 (West 1986).
207. Id. § 22. Acquired lands, however, are not open for mineral entry unless expressly made so.
See generally David P. Kimball 11, Impact of BLM Surface Management Regulations on
Exploration and Mining Operations, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 509, 510-12 (1983). See also
H. Byron Mock, Mining Law Trends, 54 DENv. L.. 567, 577 (1977) (arguing that self-initiation is
necessary to protect the public interest). For criticisms, see JOHN D. LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A
STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION (1987).
208. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 29, 35-38 (West 1986). To be valid, minerals must be found in sufficient
kind and quantity so that a reasonably prudent person would be justified in expending time and
money with the reasonable prospect of developing a paying mine. Castle v. Womble, 19 Pub. Lands
Dec. 455 (1896). A refinement of this test requires the minerals be marketable at a profit. U.S. v.
Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
209. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 611-615 (West 1986). See also 30 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West 1986). One court
applied the Act to pre-existing claims because the Mining Law of 1872 impliedly limited uses to
those reasonably necessary to mining. United States v. Langley, 587 F. Supp. 1258, 1262-63 (E.D.
Cal. 1984). See generally Kimball, supra note 207, at 512-13; John C. Miller, Surface Use Rights
Under the General Mining Law: Good Faith and Common Sense, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
761,781-88(1988).
210. Silbrico Corp. v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 333, 337 (10th Cir. 1989) (concluding miner could not
complain if other uses do not interfere with mining); United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 837 (1st
Cir. 1985) (holding miner has no expectation of privacy on mining claim); United States v. Curtis-
Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding uses must accommodate each other if
possible).
211. United States v. Richardson, 599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979), "cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014
(1980); Converse v. Udall, 399 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1025 (1969). But
see Marsh & Sherwood, supra note 203, at 224-29 (arguing that the right to manage vegetative and
other resources does not include the right to manage mineral deposits nor transform rights of miner
and BLM into correlative ones); Miller, supra note 209, at 787 (claiming that Richardson wrongly
cited "abuse" cases concered with non-mining uses of lands).
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unnecessary or undue degradation of the public lands." '2 12 This provision
delegates express authority to the BLM to regulate mining that occurs
under the auspices of the Mining Law of 1972.213
Statutes other than the Mining Law of 1872 apply to minerals other
than hardrock. Congress removed common varieties of minerals from
the operation of the mining law214 and subjected them to sale
provisions.2"5 Earlier, the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 modified
the Mining Law of 1872 so that patents would not be available for
certain minerals, commonly referred to as the fael and fertilizer
minerals.2" 6 A leasing regime gave the Secretary greater control and
discretion over development of these minerals. Although some of the
impetus for the 1920 Act was a desire to protect producers and prevent
overproduction, the Secretary's discretion included the right to protect
non-mineral, as well as mineral, values of the lands.217  Recent
amendments to the Act underscore this concern: "[T]he Secretary of the
Interior, or for National Forest lands, the Secretary of Agriculture, shall
regulate all surface-disturbing activities conducted pursuant to any lease.
. . and shall determine reclamation and other actions as required in the
interest of conservation of surface resources."2
212. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1732(c) (West 1986). The other three amendments to the Mining Law were:
1) section 314, requiring registration of claims with the BLM; 2) section 603, directing wilderness
reviews; and 3) subsection (f) of section 601, creating the California Desert Conservation Area. Id.
213. This ended debate on whether prior law authorized active management. See provisions that
arguably grant authority, 30 U.S.C.A. § 22 (West 1986) (minerals and lands containing them are
"open to exploration, occupation and purchase" "under regulations prescribr-d by law"); 43 U.S.C.A.
§ 1201 (West 1986) (granting the Secretary power to enforce management of public lands by
"appropriate regulations"). Compare Bales v. Ruch, 522 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (concluding
that the Mining Law authorized regulation) with Miller, supra note 209, at 789-90 (arguing that the
Mining Law only invited future statutes to authorize regulation). Regulations for unpatented mining
claims currently are found at 43 C.F.R. § 3802 (1992) (applying to claims within Wilderness Study
Areas) and 43 C.F.R. § 3809 (1992) (applying claims outside of Wilderness Study Areas).
214. 30 U.S.C.A. § 611 (West 1986).
215. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-604 (West 1986).
216. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-287 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993). Leasing replaced patenting for the
nonmetalliferous fuel minerals (oil, gas, oil shale, coal, native asphalt and "ituminous rock) and the
fertilizer and chemical minerals (phosphate, potash, and sodium). To coordinate leasing and
patenting authorities required the Multiple Mineral Development Act of 1954, 30 U.S.C.A.
§§ 521-531 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
217. Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 480-83 (1963). See generally Mansfield, supra note 104, at
92-98 (discussing the government's ability to consider environmental concerns both before and after
exercising its discretion to grant leases).
218. 30 U.S.C.A. § 226(g) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993), as amended by the Federal Onshore Oil
and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987, Title V of Pub. L. No. 100-203.
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Special statutes also address renewable resources directly. The Taylor
Grazing Act219 and the Public Rangelands Improvement Acte provide
authority additional to FLPMA's for forage management." The
Common Varieties Act governs not only mineral material sales, but
applies to vegetative materials, including "yucca, manzanita, mesquite,
cactus, and timber or other forest products." Additionally, certain
lands managed by the BLM, the Coos Bay lands and the revested "0 &
C" lands, which returned to federal ownership under the terms of the
grant to the Oregon and California Railroad, are especially managed for
timber production and the secondary goal of recreation. 4
As this recitation of authorities shows, the BLM is not a single
purpose agency, although courts have occasionally declared a particular
land management statute to have a singular purpose.' The BLM's
organic statute, FLPMA, itself appears "internally inconsistent, reflecting
different concerns of environmentalists, miners, and ranchers."' 6
Among Congress's commands in FLPMA are schizophrenic directives to
both encourage mining and preserve land in its natural condition. To
some extent, the psychological trauma may fade by taking a broader
view. As one judge put it: "Some lands can be preserved, while others,
more appropriately, can be mined." 7  Nevertheless, BLM decisions
regarding public lands are polycentric and made with multiple criteria
and no overriding substantive guide post. 8 Only in areas dedicated to
particular management regimes is this dilemma lessened. 29
219. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 315-315r (West 1986).
220. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1908 (West 1986).
221. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1751-1753 (West 1986). See generally COGGINS, supra note 23, § 19.03.
222. Pub. L. No. 167, ch. 375, 69 Stat. 367-73 (1955).
223. 30 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West 1986).
224. 0 & C Act of 1937, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ l181a-1181j (West 1986). See Headwaters Inc. v.
Bureau of Land Management, 914 F.2d 1174, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1990); 43 C.F.R § 3821 (1992)
(listing special rules for mining claims).
225. See, e.g., Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp. 1113, 1117-18 (D. Nev. 1989) (primary intent of
grazing statutes is to protect livestock).
226. Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (D. Utah 1979).
227. Id. at 1003. See Coggins, supra note 202, at 10 (noting that courts ignore proviso about
policies needing statutory enactment and treat them as binding).
228. See Mansfield, supra note 201, at 498-499. FLPMA does require "consideration" of diverse
values and other procedural steps, which may indirectly moderate BLM activity. Id. at 494-95.
229. See infra part V.E.
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B. The National Forests
The Forest Service, an agency of the Department of Agriculture,
manages National Forests. National Forests were created primarily by
being "reserved" from the public domain. 30 Initially, the functions of
National Forests were clear; they were for "improv[ing] and protect[ing]
the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable
conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of
timber."23' The Supreme Court in United States v. New Mexico 2
interpreted these words from the Organic Administration Act of 189723
to establish only two purposes: watershed protection and timber
production. "Protection" of the forests, arguably a distinct third function,
was only operative in regard to the watershed and timber purposes.24
Nevertheless, legislation since the original Organic Administration Act
of 1897 has increased the management mandates for the National
Forests,235 and many of the mineral laws applicable on BLM lands also
operate in National Forests. Therefore, despite the original limits of the
Organic Act, the National Forests do not necessarily have a more
regimented purpose than the BLM public lands.
The National Forests have always supported more uses than just
timber production and watershed protection. The forests are open to
location under the Mining Law of 1872, with regulatory authority split
between the Department of Interior and the Forest Service. The BLM
administers the Mining Law itself,26 but the Forest Service regulates the
surface impacts of mining. Forest Service regulations reveal a
230. See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text. Under the Weeks Forestry Act of 1911, as
amended, land could also be acquired for forests, which explains the preser ce of National Forests in
the eastern states. 16 U.S.C.A. § 515 (West 1985). Because the act allowed grantors to reserve
minerals in conveyances to the United States, litigation on who owns what resources is fairly
common. See, e.g., Downstate Stone Co. v. United States, 712 F.2d 121 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding
that the right to quarry limestone is not reserved in mineral rights reservation).
231. 16 U.S.C.A. § 475 (West 1985).
232. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
233. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 473-482 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
234. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S 696, 707 n.14 (1978). National Forests therefore
have water rights commensurate with the purposes of the initial reservations and not for recreation or
wildlife protection. Id. See also, United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491 (Colo. 1987) (recognizing
water rights for watershed protection). For general information on reserved water rights, see
COGGINS, supra note 23, § 4.04[4].
235. The Supreme Court noted that no one argued that the later enactments created new reserved
rights with later priority dates. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 713 n.21.
236. The 1905 Act transferring jurisdiction of National Forests to the Department of Agriculture
specified that Interior would retain this authority. 16 U.S.C.A. § 472 (West 1985).
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fundamental compromise: miners have "a statutory right to enter upon
the public lands to search for minerals, [but operations] shall be
conducted so as to minimize adverse environmental impacts on National
Forest System surface resources." 37 These regulations do not allow the
government to forbid mining, but simply to tailor it. 8 This comports
with the Forest Service Organic Act, which forbids action that "would
prohibit any person from entering upon such national forests for all
proper and lawful purposes, including that of prospecting, locating, and
developing the mineral resources thereof." 9  National Forests are also
open to leasing under the Mineral Leasing Act, which requires the Forest
Service's consent to a lease, and gives the Forest Service control over
surface disturbing activities.24
The Forest Service authorized other uses in National Forests with less
formal congressional authority than that contained in the mineral statutes.
The 1897 Organic Act gave the Forest Service general authority to make
rules and regulations governing occupancy and use of the forests.24
Pursuant to this grant, the Forest Service regulated grazing through a
permit system.242 Another use, outdoor recreation, was fostered pursuant
to permits for recreational facilities243 and by administrative action. An
example of the latter was the Forest Service's designation of certain areas
as "wild," "canoe," or "wilderness," for which the Forest Service
237. 36 C.F.R. § 228.1 (1991). The regulation further states that its purposes do not include
management of mineral resources.
238. Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932, 941 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the Forest Service
may not "prohibit... possession and enjoyment of... claims, or to encroach impermissibly upon
those rights by circumscribing their use" too strictly); United States v. Weiss, 642 F.2d 296 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding that the regulations are authorized to minimize harm, not to interfere with mining).
See generally Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the
National Forests, 64 ORL. REV. 1,254-61 (1985).
239. 16 U.S.C.A. § 478 (1985); see also Weiss, 642 F.2d at 299 (finding mining to be a favored
use of forests but miners must attempt to coexist with other uses of forests).
240. 30 U.S.C.A. § 226(h) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (containing requirement for lands reserved
from the public domain). See also 30 U.S.C.A. § 352 (West 1986) (generally requiring consent for
leases on acquired lands). For the division of authority prior to the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas
Leasing Reform Act of 1987, see Mansfield, supra note 101, at 91.
241. 16 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
242. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911). The first statute in the area was passed in 1950.
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 580k-5801 (West 1985) (setting up advisory boards and authorizing permitting). See
generally COGGINS, supra note 23, § 19.04.
243. 16 U.S.C.A. § 497 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
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required special management.' Congress, however, did not formally
change the general statutory mandate of the National Forests until 1960.
In that year, the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 was
enacted.245 This Act supplemented the purposes for which National
Forests would be managed:
[T]he national forests are established and shall be administered for
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish
purposes. The purposes of . . . this title are declared to be
supplemental to, but not in derogation of, the purposes for which
the national forests were established as set out in ... [the Organic
Administration Act of 1897].246
Some courts have read the act as giving range, recreation, and wildlife
"equal footing" with timber and watershed protection.247 The Supreme
Court, however, inferred that these additional purposes were
"secondary" '48 and other courts have adopted this interpretation. 49
The significance attached to timber production is reflected in
Congress's reaction to the so-called Monongahela decision,25 which
involved clear-cutting." Environmentalists alleged, and the court
agreed, that implementing clear-cutting exceeded the power granted by
the Organic Administration Act of 1897, which authorized the Forest
Service to sell only "dead, matured or large growth of trees," 2  and,
244. See Section 3 of the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (.1988) (designating areas
so classified as wilderness).
245. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-531 (West 1985).
246. Id. § 528.
247. Intermountain Forest Industry Ass'n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Wyo. 1988). The Forest
Service supposedly prefixed "outdoor" to "recreation" to show its importance despite the fact that
the listing order was substantively unimportant; listing was in alphabetical order. COGGINS ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 610.
248. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 715 (1978).
249. Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971), reversed on other grounds sub
nom. Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20293 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that the
Forest Service must give "due," but not "equal" consideration to each resource); National Wildlife
Fed'n v. United States Forest Service, 592 F. Supp. 931 (D. Or. 1984) (concluding that equal
consideration is not required), appeal dismissed, 801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1986); O'Neal v. United
States, 814 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1987) (timber is primary purpose and recreation is secondary).
250. West Virginia Division of Izaac Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975)
[hereinafter Izaac Walton League].
251. For background on the pros and cons of clearcutting, see COGGINS Er AL., supra note 11, at
620-24.
252. 16 U.S.C.A. § 476 (West 1985) (before amendment and repeal by the National Forest
Management Act of 1976); Izaac Walton League, 522 F.2d at 947-48.
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further, violated the requirement that timber be "marked and designated"
before being sold. 3 One year later, in the National Forest Management
Act of 1976 (NFMA),' Congress removed these restrictions. The
NFMA, however, was not totally skewed towards timber development.
It mandated various silviculture standards and extensive planning for
the forests."56 Additionally, most federal timber contracts, either by
express contract terms or extant regulations, allow the Forest Service to
cancel or modify such contracts to prevent environmental harm.257
One additional and highly visible use of National Forests is for ski
areas. Initially, two authorities licensed this use. The Forest Service
granted permits for the base facilities pursuant to a 1915 act governing
recreational permits, amended in 1956," which limited grants to eighty
acres. The runs and other areas were authorized by revocable permits
under the authority of the basic Organic Act. 59 The National Forest Ski
Area Act of 1986260 increased the acreage available for such permits, but
directed an increased supervisory role for the Forest Service, and
required operators to pay fair market fees for the right to use the land.
These provisions recognized that the intensive use which results from ski
areas often creates conflicts with wildlife and other forest values.261
The National Forests are subject to disparate uses and competing
interests. Statutes seemingly limit the uses to seven,262 and of those, the
253. 16 U.S.C.A. § 476 (West 1985); Izaac Walton League, 522 F.2d at 947-48.
254. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1614 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
255. E.g., id. §§ 1604(g)(3)(E)-(F). See National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Service,
592 F. Supp. 931, 937 (D. Or. 1984), appeal dismissed, 801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
NFMA standards are binding).
256. See generally Symposium on Federal Forest Law and Policy, 17 ENVTL. L. 429 (1987). An
earlier planning statute, which also considered budgeting problems, was the Forest and Rangeland
Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1613 (West 1985 & Supp.
1993). See National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Other
problems of the timber industry, such as the impact of falling prices on existing contracts, were
separately addressed. Federal Timber Contract Payment Modification Act of 1984, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 618 (West 1985) (authorizing buy-outs of contracts bid before January 1, 1982).
257. Stone Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 489 (1991); Louisiana Pac. Corp. v.
United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 413 (1988).
258. 16 U.S.C.A. § 497 (West 1985).
259. See Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24,34-35 (9th Cir. 1970).
260. 16 U.S.C.A. § 497b (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
261. For examples of these conflicts see Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332 (1989).
262. Outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes. 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 528 (West 1985). NFMA adds wilderness to the list. Id. § 1604(e)(1) (West 1985). Mineral uses
are the responsibility of the Department of Interior.
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263Forest Service has traditionally favored timber management.
Nevertheless, Forest Service statutory mandates do not dictate specific
uses for any particular tracts of Forest Service land unless a tract is
included in a specialized management regime.2 "
C. The National Parks
The National Parks are managed by the National Park Service, which
is an agency of the Department of Interior. The Park Service also
administers National Monuments, 265 National Recreation Areas,266 and
other types of properties. 67 Each National Park, as is true with most
components of the National Park system,268 has its own authorizing
statute that determines the resource uses permitted in that area.
Therefore, the sources of law applicable to National Parks are varied.
Nevertheless, there is a general organic statute for the National Park
Service and other generic environmental legislation may be applicable.269
Both forms of authority will apply in all units in the system unless a
specific governing statute conflicts.
The National Park Service Organic Act was passed in 1916.270 Unlike
the BLM and Forest Service mandates, this legislation gives the Park
Service a more focused vision:
[T]he fundamental purpose of the said parks.., is to conserve the
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein
and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and
263. See Randal O'Toole, Recreation Fees and the Yellowstone Forests, in THE GREATER
YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM: REDEFINING AMERICA'S WILDERNESS HERITAGE 41, 42 (Robert B.
Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991) (arguing that economic incentives skewed toward timber
production because Forest Service retains some timber revenues).
264. See infra part V.E.
265. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
266. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 460n-460ss (West 1993 & Supp. 1993).
267. These include national seashores and urban parks. The National Park System encompasses
80 million acres in 338 areas in 49 states. There are 49 National Parks. See COGGINS, supra note
23, § 2.03[2][a].
268. "National Park System" is defmed as "any area of land and water now or hereafter
administered by the Secretary of Interior through the National Park Service for park, monument,
historic, parkway, recreational or other purposes." 16 U.S.C.A. § lc(a) (West 1992).
269. See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370(c) (West 1977 & Supp.
1993); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
270. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-4,22,43 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
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by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations.27
These purposes justify reserving water for wildlife, aesthetic, and
recreational purposes, in contrast to the scope of the functions of the
National Forests.272 Nevertheless, disagreements and tensions may arise
in interpreting management prerogatives because the Organic Act
apparently requires the Park Service to both "preserve" parks unimpaired
and to provide for their use and enjoyment by the public. 3
This conflict manifests itself in several settings. One is the
controversy over fire control policies. While fire is a natural component
of the ecosystem, it may threaten established facilities and therefore
require control. Such control runs counter to the non-intervention
perspective.274 Conflicts less dramatic, but equally important, may occur
between people's desire to visit National Parks that provide amenities
and the desire for pure preservation in the National Parks.275
Often, conveniences are provided. In order to do so, the National Park
Service may itself develop facilities such as campgrounds27 6 and roads.277
It also contracts with "concessionaires" to provide additional services.278
Standards for concession contracts reflect the fundamental Park Service
271. Id. § 1.
272. Compare United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 30 (Colo. 1982) (holding
that National Parks have recreational and aesthetic purposes beyond those of National Forests) with
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 708-10 (1978) (holding that National Forests have no
reserved water rights for such purposes).
273. See generally John Lemons & Dean Stout, A Reinterpretation of National Park Legislation,
15 ENVTL. L. 41 (1984) (arguing that the traditional view emphasizes conflict but concludes that
basic fiduciary duty is preservation); William A. Shutkin, Note, The National Park Act Revisited, 10
VA. ENVTL. L.. 345 (1991) (arguing that the intent was to subordinate utilitarian uses to
preservation).
274. See generally Dennis H. Knight, The Yellowstone Fire Controversy, in THE GREATER
YELLOWSTONE ECOsYSTEM: REDEFINING AMERICA'S WILDERNESS HERITAGE 87 (Robert B. Keiter
& Mark S. Boyce, eds., 1991).
275. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE
NATIONAL PARKS (1980); Joseph L. Sax, Fashioning a Recreation Policy for Our National
Parklands: The Philosophy of Choice and the Choice of Philosophy, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 973
(1979).
276. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park Service, 669 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987)
(upholding the National Park Service decision to keep campground open despite conflict with
grizzly bear habitat).
277. Roads, trails, and bridges are expressly authorized. 16 U.S.C.A. § 8 (West 1992).
278. Such an option is subject to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 4321-4347 (West 1977 & Supp. 1993). Sierra Club v. Lujan, 716 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Ariz. 1989)
(enjoining construction of hotel for insufficient compliance). On litigation over concession contracts
generally, see COGGINS, supra note 23, § 17.0412].
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dilemma: the development must be "necessary and appropriate for public
use and enjoyment" of a park and "consistent to the highest practicable
degree with the preservation and conservation of the areas." '279
One tool for synthesizing these concerns is through planning, which
Congress has emphasized in its mandate to the Park Service, as it has
with the other land management agencies. The National Park Service
must produce "master plans" for each unit. These plans must address
measures to preserve the areas, consider visitor carrying capacity, and
discuss needed developments.280 Popular recreational uses sometimes
must be limited and regulated by permit because "enjoyment" may
destroy resources.281 The Park Service exercises significant discretion in
making such allocations.282
Uses of the National Parks for other than preservation and recreation
are limited. Hunting, although recreation to some, generally is not
allowed.28 The Mineral Leasing Act and Mining Law of 1872 do not
apply in National Parks as they do in National Forests and BLM public
lands.284 Mining claims that pre-date the establishment of a National
Park, however, are valid existing rights, but they are regulated to protect
park values.28  The Park Service may grant rights-of-way through the
National Park for utility purposes, but only if the Park Service finds them
to be "in the public interest." '286 Timber may be disposed of only when
its removal is needed "to control the attacks of insects or diseases or
otherwise conserve the scenery or the natural or historic objects." 287
Similarly, livestock may graze within a National Park only if "such use is
279. 16 U.S.C.A. § 20, part of the Concessions Policy Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 20-20g (West
1992). For criticisms of the act, see Michael Mantell, Preservation and Use: Concessions in the
National Parks, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1979).
280. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ la-7(b) (West 1992).
281. See Wilderness Public Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 982 (1980) (upholding permits for boating in the Grand Canyon); see also Friends of
Yosemite v. Frizzell, 420 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (claiming unsuc..essfully that advertising
would result in tourist numbers that would damage the environment of the park).
282. Conservation Law Found. v. Secretary of the Interior, 864 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding
the allocation of eight miles of seashore to off-road vehicles not "arbitrary or capricious").
283. See National Rifle Ass'n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1986).
284. There can be exceptions in specific units of the National Park System. This is more common
for units other than parks. For example, leasing of minerals is allowed in the Lake Mead National
Recreation Area under special regulations. See 43 C.F.R. § 3811.2-2 (1991); Sierra Club v. Watt,
566 F. Supp. 380 (D. Utah 1983) (holding that defendant may lease locatable minerals).
285. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3833.2-1, 3826 (1991); 36 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.8 (1991). See 16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1901-1911 (West 1985).
286. 16 U.S.C.A. § 5 (West 1992).
287. 16 U.S.C.A. § 3 (West 1992).
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not detrimental to the primary purpose for which such park... was
created." 88 Thus, the fundamental goals of the parks are kept in sight.
The National Parks are governed by statutes that provide some
discretion, but arguably seek to guide management into particular areas.
In accord with the preservation directive, there was a movement in the
late seventies to impose a public trust requirement on the Park Service,
one which would protect the National Parks from external threats. The
movement, however, was abortive. In litigation over management of
redwood forests in California, the district court initially ruled that the
National Park Service had an enforceable public trust duty to protect the
Redwood National Park from adjacent logging. The Park Service's duty
was derived from both the statute creating the park and common law.289
In later stages of the litigation, however, the statute's commands
overshadowed any trust duty.2 The court finally deemed the public
trust doctrine irrelevant because Congress had amended the National
Park Organic Act to specify greater management priorities.29' The
National Parks, therefore, are governed solely by the statutes of general
applicability and the specific legislation establishing individual parks.
288. Id. This provision does not apply to Yellowstone National Park.
289. Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 93-95 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See
generally Robert B. Keiter, On Protecting the National Parks from the External Threats Dilemma,
20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 355 (1984). See also County of Trinity v. Andrus, 438 F. Supp. 1368,
1377-78 (E.D. Cal. 1977) (holding that statutory and general trust duties forbid the Park Service to
use discretion to avoid preservation).
290. Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v.
Department of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters
of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL.
L. 425, 276-77 (1989) (questioning whether the doctrine applies to public lands; redwood cases
dealt with "strong" commanding statutes unlike most governing the BLM). See also Friends of
Yosemite v. Frizzell, 420 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (brushing aside public trust doctrine claim).
291. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980) aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (concluding that the statute is the exclusive
source of duties, but its "highest principles of management" resemble public trust duty). The 1978
amendments to the National Parks Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 166 (codified at 16
U.S.C.A. § la(l) (West 1992)), discussed in these cases sparked debate as to whether a strong
"public trust" responsibility emerged. Compare Keiter, supra note 289, at 369-75 (finding an
affirmative duty to combat external threats to park resources) with Coggins, supra note 62, at 16-17
(claiming that statutory evidence requiring such action is tenuous and counterbalanced by language
concentrating on protection of wildlife within parks) and Keiter, supra note 62, at 949
(acknowledging that courts hesitate to impose duties to combat external threats).
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D. National Wildlife Refuge System
The Fish and Wildlife Service, an agency of the Department of
Interior, manages the National Wildlife Refuge System. As noted above,
presidents began making withdrawals for wildlife purposes pursuant to
their implied authority.2 92 Congress provided additional impetus for such
wildlife areas with the passage of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of
1918.293 Administration of the refuges often depended, and continues to
depend, on the terms of specific public land orders and statutes creating
them.294 Like statutes that create National Parks, any statute creating a
specific refuge must be consulted to determine what uses are allowed in
that refuge. In the 1960s, however, three acts were passed as generic
authority to manage the refuges: the Refuge Recreation Act of 1962,295
the Refuge Revenue Sharing Act of 1964,296 and the National Wildlife
Refuge System Administration Act of 1966.297 Therefore, some
generalizations are possible.
Wildlife refuges, despite their name, are not "inviolate sanctuaries" for
animals. The Fish and Wildlife Service does, however, manage them for
the primary purpose of protecting and promoting wildlife values.
Nevertheless, other activities may take place in refuges. For example,
the Mineral Leasing Act and the Mining Law of 1872 can continue to
operate if they were applicable to the areas in question when Congress
passed the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of
1966.29 Special regulations apply, however, and the Secretary may
always decline to lease particular refuge lands.299 Refuges may also be
used for purposes other than wildlife and mineral development.
Sometimes Congress provides direct authorization for these additional
uses. The Refuge Recreation Act, as its name indicates, authorizes
recreational use of refuges but only as an "appropriate incidental or
secondary use" and "only to the extent that is practicable and not
292. See supra note 129. See generally MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW 125-34 (1983).
293. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 703-712 (,Vest 1985 & Supp. 1993).
294. See Schwenke v. Secretary of the Interior, 720 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1983) (interpreting the
requirements for administration of the Russell Range).
295. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 460k-460k-4 (West 1993).
296. 16 U.S.C.A. § 715s (West 1985).
297. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 668dd-668ee (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
298. Id.
299. Id. § 668dd(d)(1); Dana J. Stotsky, Note, Taking Refuge: Policy Changes Affecting Oil and
Gas Leasing on National Wildlife Refuges, 64 OR. L. REV. 739 (1986).
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inconsistent with ... the primary objectives for which each particular
area is established."3  These preconditions significantly limit the
agency's discretion to allow recreational use. The Ruby Lake litigation0 1
involved regulations that allowed the use of motor boats, both generally
and for water skiing, in a refuge in Nevada. The district court found the
initial regulations invalid because the Fish and Wildlife Service made no
finding that the recreational uses would not interfere with the purposes of
the refuge. The agency had an affirmative duty to make this finding.
The Secretary could not simply balance competing interests or justify
continuing harmful recreational uses merely because the same abuses had
occurred in the past. 2 After remand and redrafting, the district court
found the second set of regulations infirm because the permitted use
would negatively impact on the ability of the migratory birds to use the
lake.30
3
The standard explicated in Ruby Lake governs recreational use, but the
Refuge Administration Act allows uses other than recreation under a
second standard. This standard requires such uses be "compatible with
the major purposes for which such areas were established."3' The Act
generally allows the Fish and Wildlife Service to authorize use for "any
purpose, including but not limited to hunting, fishing, public recreation
and accommodations, and access." 305  Hunting and fishing, when
allowed, must be consistent "to the extent practicable" with State fish
and wildlife regulations.306 Federal regulations, however, may preempt
state law if necessary to preserve the refuge, and the initial presumption
is that refuges are closed to hunting and fishing.30 7 Generally, courts
have upheld the Secretary's discretion to allow hunting, especially of
300. 16 U.S.C.A. § 460k (West 1993). The later Refuge Administration Act expressly states that
the Recreation Act will govern recreational uses. Id. § 668dd(h).
301. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 11 E.R.C. 2098 (D.D.C. 1978); Defenders of Wildlife v.
Andrus, 455 F. Supp. 446 (D.D.C. 1978).
302. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2098, 2101 (D.D.C. 1978).
303. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 455 F. Supp. 446 (D.D.C. 1978).
304. 16 U.S.C.A. § 668dd(d)(1)(A). See Jerry R. Fish, Comment, Preservation and Strategic
Mineral Development in Alaska: Congress Writes a New Equation, 12 ENVTL. L. 137, 166-73
(1981).
305. 16 U.S.C.A. § 668dd(d)(1)(A). Easements may also be granted for utilities, pipelines, roads,
and other developments. Id. § 668dd(d)(1)(B).
306. Id. § 668dd(c).
307. Id. § 668dd(c) (stating that no one may take or possess any animals, birds, or fish or enter for
such purposes unless permitted by regulation or statute).
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large herbivores, partially because reduction of herd size arguably aids
habitat maintenance. °8
National Wildlife Refuges, therefore, have numerous potential uses,
but existing law clearly requires the Fish and Wildlife Service to give
priority to wildlife management and treat it as the primary or dominant
use of refuges. For example, a court overturned a proposed land
exchange, which would have removed land from the St. Matthew's
Island National Wildlife Refuge, because the Secretary's "public
interest" determination was flawed. The Secretary characterized damage
to wildlife values as "temporary," and thus inappropriately downgraded
the harm.309 The strict review of the Secretary's action in this case was
unusual because the Secretary does have considerable discretion under
the various management acts. Therefore, unlike this case, most of the
cases underscoring the priority of wildlife values are ones that affirm
secretarial action restricting activities in Wildlife Refuges.310
E. Wilderness Areas
Wilderness Areas differ from the previous systems examined because
they, like Wild and Scenic Rivers"' and National Trails,312 are not
managed by a single agency. If Congress designates land as part of one
of these systems, the agency with jurisdiction over that land before
designation manages it consistent with the purposes contained in the
relevant statute.313 In other words, the Wilderness Act of 1964 provides
management authority to administer wilderness areas to the BLM, the
Forest Service, the National Park Service, and the Fish and Wildlife
Service. 31
4
Lands enter the system through a lengthy process. The Wilderness
Act initially designated certain areas of the National Forests as
308. Humane Society v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 360 (D.D.C. 1991).
309. National Audubon Society v. Clark, 606 F. Supp. 825, 846 (D. Alas-a 1984).
310. See, e.g., New England Naturist Ass'n v. Larsen, 692 F. Supp. 75 (D.R.I. 1988) (upholding
closing refuge entirely to protect endangered species); National Rifle Ass'r, v. Kleppe, 425 F. Supp.
1101 (D.D.C. 1976), affd sub nom. National Rifle Ass'n v. Andrus 571 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
The problems of selenium poisoning in Kesterson Natural Wildlife Refuge are explored in Charles
T. DuMars, What in the World is Kesterson: Agricultural Return Flows Degrading Water Quality,
35 RoCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 24-1 (1989).
311. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1281 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
312. See id. § 1246 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
313. See, e.g., id. § 1131(b) (West 1985) (Wilderness Act provision onjurisdiction).
314. Id. §§ 1131-1136 (West 1985).
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wilderness," 5 and mandated reviews of additional areas in National
Forests, 16 and of roadless areas of more than 5,000 acres in units of the
National Park and National Wildlife Refuge Systems.3" 7 The Act also
required review of roadless refuge islands and FLPMA added BLM lands
to the review process. 31' The agency with jurisdiction over the particular
land performs the review. At the end of the agency review, the President
recommends to Congress areas to include in the system. Lands only
become wilderness if designated by Congress. 3
19
During the review process, however, interim management may require
the relevant agency to forego some activities in order to preserve
congressional options.32° This is necessary to ensure an area can
continue to meet the definition of a wilderness. A "wilderness" is "an
area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and
influence, . ..which . . .generally appears to have been affected
primarily by the forces of nature.... , 32" Wildernesses additionally must
contain at least 5,000 acres, 3' be "without permanent improvements,"
and have "outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and
unconfined type of recreation.""
If Congress designates an area as wilderness, the statute specifically
creating the wilderness area may specify management criteria.324
Although potentially overridden by such particular legislation, the
315. Id. § 1132(a). These 54 "instant wilderness areas" were the Forest Service's "wilderness,"
"wild," and "canoe" areas, and totaled 9.1 million acres. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 11, at
1014.
316. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1132(b). The Act required review of 5.4 million acres of designated
"primitive" areas. The Forest Service voluntarily reviewed roadless areas of 5,000 or more acres.
See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753,757 (9th Cir. 1982).
317. 16U.S.C.A. § 1132(c).
318. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1782 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
319. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1131(a) (West 1985).
320. See generally COGGINS, supra note 23, § 14.04[3]. For BLM lands, see Mansfield, supra
note 33, at 56-59.
321. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1131(c) (West 1985).
322. Or the wilderness must be ofa sufficient size to be managed effectively for preservation. Id.
323. Id. See also id. § 1132(c); 43 U.S.C.A. § 1782(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (requiring
future National Park and BLM wildernesses to be "roadless").
324. See, e.g., "special management zone" in River of No Return Wilderness that allows for
mining of cobalt. Central Idaho Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 96-312, § 4(d)(1), 94 Stat. 948, 949
(1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1133 note (1988)). See also Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing the statutory exception to prohibition of
logging in wilderness areas). Congress in 1978 removed the exception at issue in Butz. Boundary
Waters Canoe Area Wilderness, Pub. L. No. 95-495 § 695(a), 92 Stat. 1649 (1978) (noted at 16
U.S.C.A. § 1133 (West 1988)).
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Wilderness Act itself does provide general management guidance. An
agency's mandate under the Act is as follows:
[to] preserv[e] the wilderness character of the area and . . .
administer such area for such other purposes for which it may have
been established.... Except as otherwise provided... , wilderness
areas shall be devoted to the public purposes of recreational, scenic,
scientific, educational, conservation, and historical use.3 5
The Act's initial policy declaration elaborates:
[Wilderness areas] shall be administered for the use and enjoyment
of the American people in such manner as will leave them
unimpaired for future uses and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as
to provide for the protection of the areas, the preservation of their
wilderness character, and for the gathering and dissemination of
information regarding their use and enjoyment as wilderness.326
The "use and enjoyment" versus preservation paradox, found here as in
the National Park Service mandate,"' is weighted toward preservation in
this setting, as evidenced by the definition of wilderness.
To reach the preservation goal, the Wilderness Act does specifically
prohibit certain uses, but being born of compromise, the legislation
allows other activities to continue. The basic prohibitions forbid
commercial enterprises, permanent and temporary roads, use of
motorized vehicles or boats, aircraft landings, and structures.328 The
wording of the general ban itself contains two caveats: The ban is subject
to valid existing rights and the need to meet "minimum requirements" for
administration of the area, including emergency responses.329 Moreover,
the next subsection of the act lists "special provisions" that allow specific
activities in certain circumstances.330
The activities allowed by the "special provisions" include some
mineral operations. Wilderness areas are subject to governmental
mineral surveys, and National Forest wildernesses are open to
325. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1133(b) (West 1985).
326. Id. § 1131(a).
327. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
328. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1133(c) (West 1985).
329. See generally RohIf & Honnold, supra note 62, at 261-62 (discussing the "minimum toor'
approach in wilderness management).
330. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1133(d) (West 1985). See generally COGGINS, supra note 23, § 14.04[4][c;
COGGINS ET AL., supra note 11, at 1016-18.
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prospecting that does not impair the wilderness.33 More controversially,
even designated wilderness areas were open to mineral location332 and
mineral leasing until December 31, 1983. However, except during the
tenure of Secretary Watt and his successor, the Department of Interior
generally did not issue mineral leases and Congress eventually prohibited
leasing altogether in BLM wilderness study areas and other areas
recommended for wilderness. 333 Also revealing a compromise, locators
may work mining claims subject to regulation, but they will only receive
patent to the minerals, not the surface.334  Although all existing
wildernesses are now withdrawn from the operation of the Mining Law
of 1872 unless the wilderness's governing statute specifically made it
open, valid existing rights could impact wilderness values as they are
developed.335
In addition to mineral uses, other special provisions may override the
goal of preservation. Some exceptions detail preexisting uses and allow
them to continue. These include motorized boat use336 and grazing.
337
Additionally, the managing agency must provide reasonable access to
inholdings, or must exchange the inholdings for other lands.338 Despite
the ban on commercial enterprises, services conducive to or necessary for
wilderness recreational activities may proceed.339 The managing agency
itself may also take actions that seem incongruous with wilderness.
One controversial provision of the Act allows the managing agency to
actively manage a wilderness area in ways that could impact its
wilderness character. The agency may take "such measures ... as may
be necessary in the control of fire, insects, and diseases. '"34 The Forest
331. 16U.S.C.A. § 1133(d)(2).
332. This provision only preserved existing access and did not revoke any pre-existing statutorily
authorized withdrawal. Brown v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 679 F.2d 747, 750-51 (8th Cir. 1982).
333. 30 U.S.C.A. § 226-3 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993). Prior to this, limitations appeared in
Department of Interior appropriation bills and Congress ordered emergency withdrawals. See
Mansfield, supra note 104, at 89-90.
334. Analogous provisions have been found constitutional against claims that an act "took" a
claimant's right to a patent of both surface and minerals. Freese v. United States, 639 F.2d 754 (Ct.
CI.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981).
335. See generally Kathryn Toffenetti, Valid Existing Rights in Wilderness Areas, 20 LAND &
WATER L. Rv. 31 (1985).
336. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1133(d)(1) (West 1985). Aircraft use may also continue subject to restrictions
deemed desirable. Id.
337. Id. § 1133(d)(4).
338. Id. § 1134.
339. Id. § 1133(d)(5).
340. Id. § 1133(d)(1).
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Service attempted to use this authority to fight an infestation of the
Southern Pine Beetle so that it could protect adjacent commercial timber
lands.34" ' The initial program would have involved extensive spraying
and cutting of trees within the Wilderness Area. The district court first
found that the Forest Service had not proven the activity "necessary;" it
required "a clear necessity for upsetting the equilibrium of the ecology..
. [to] justify this highly injurious, semi-experimental venture of limited
effectiveness."342 A second, more limited program of spot-clearing and
spraying, however, was approved. In considering the second program,
the court exercised deference to the Secretary's judgment, and
recognized it should not attempt to resolve scientific controversy.343
Wilderness areas, as this case and the other provisions demonstrate, are
not inviolable.
Nevertheless, the fact that actions taken to protect other property may
validly impact on wilderness, and uses other than wilderness preservation
may occur in Wilderness Areas, the basic management goal is to
preserve the wilderness characteristics of designated areas. Other uses
are subordinate to this dominant use.
VI. MULTIPLE USE VERSUS DOMINANT USE
The discussion of the mandates and missions governing the principal
land management systems reveals that some agencies have a myriad of
duties with no guiding principles, while other agencies have priorities.
Wildlife refuges and wilderness areas have specific "dominant" uses.
National Parks also have the dual dominant uses of preservation and
enjoyment. The National Forests and BLM public lands, however, do
not have any clear-cut dominant uses. They are in fact subjected to
"multiple uses," but the term "multiple use" has a legal meaning in
addition to its practical one. Four statutes have employed the term, often
coupled with the term "sustained yield."
A. Statutory Provisions
Statutes governing both the BLM and the Forest Service refer to the
multiple use goal. The Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 first
341. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1987) (Lyngl) and Sierra Club v. Lyng, 663 F.
Supp. 556 (D.D.C. 1987) (Lyng II).
342. LyngI, 662 F. Supp. at 43.
343. Lyng , 663 F. Supp. at 560.
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employed the term "multiple use."3" This Act applied only to the Forest
Service. It was not until 1964 that the concept was applied to the
BLM.34' The instructions to the two agencies have similarities.
The first thing the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 did,
however, was specific to the Forest Service. It confirmed, as the agency
had previously alleged, that it had authority to manage the National
Forests for more than timber and watershed purposes.346 The Forest
Service is also required to consider multiple use and sustained yield in
the National Forest Management Act of 1976." The later Act gives no
new definitions. Therefore, the operative definition of multiple use for
the Forest Service comes from the 1960 act:
The management of all the various renewable surface resources of
the national forests so that they are utilized in the combination that
will best meet the needs of the American people; making the most
judicious use of the land for some or all of these resources or
related services over areas large enough to provide sufficient
latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing
needs and conditions; that some land will be used for less than all
of the resources; and harmonious and coordinated management of
the various resources, each with the other, without impairment of
the productivity of the land, with consideration being given to the
relative values of the various resources, and not necessarily the
combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or the
greatest unit output. 48
The standard does not necessarily demand a utilitarian result in terms of
increasing dollar yields. What it does do, despite the acknowledgment
that not every tract of land can be utilized for all resources, is give the
impression that committing land to a single use is not preferred.349 The
344. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-531 (West 1985).
345. See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1411-1418 (West 1986) (expired 1970).
346. See supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
347. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600(3), 1602(5)(A), 1604(e)(1) (West 1985). The resources listed in
this act, however, include "wilderness" with outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife
and fish. Id. § 1604(e)(1).
348. Id. § 53 1(a) (emphasis added).
349. See PAUL CULHANE, PUBLIC LANDS POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE ON THE FOREST
SERVICE AND BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 327 (1981); Richard Behan, The Succotash
Syndrome, or Multiple Use: A Heartfelt Approach to Forest Land Management, 7 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 473, 478, 481-83 (1967) (arguing that multiple use is an emotionally attractive concept that in
practice simply fostered multiplicity for multiplicity's sake). The Act, however, did expressly state
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Forest Service, however, has always been capable of finding uses
"compatible" with seemingly single purpose commitments; a clear cut
may be compatible with wildlife habitat management because it provides
deer forage.
The second management goal is "sustained yield of the several
products and services." "Sustained yield" is defined as "the achievement
and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic
output of the various renewable resources of the national forests without
impairment of the productivity of the land."35' According to this, the Act
requires the Forest Service to consider the future as well as the present.
The second major land managing agency, the BLM, was first required
to manage its lands for multiple use under the Classification and Multiple
Use Act.352 This was an interim law that expired. FLPMA, however,
also expresses the policy that the BLM manage public lands "on the basis
of multiple use and sustained yield unless otherwise specified by law." '353
FLPMA's definition of sustained yield does not significantly differ from
that applicable to the Forest Service.354  Both definitions demand
scientific management. The more significant differences occur in the
definitions of multiple use applicable to each agency.
A comparison of the two definitions reveals that one part of the
FLPMA definition only subtly differs from that of the Forest Service
mandate:
the management of the public lands and their various resource
values so that they are utilized in the combination that will best
meet the present and future needs of the American people; making
the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these resources
or related services over areas large enough to provide sufficient
that the establishment of wilderness areas was consistent with the purposes of it. 16 U.S.C.A. § 529
(West 1985).
350. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 11, at 612. See also Zieske v. Butz, 406 F. Supp 258, 259 (D.
Alaska 1975) (clear-cutting does not violate the Multiple-Use, Sustained-YiId Act).
351. 16U.S.C.A. § 531(b) (West 1985).
352. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1411-1418 (West 1986) (expired 1970). For a critical view of this Act, see
Marsh & Sherwood, supra note 203, at 247-50 (arguing that the multiple use mandate is ominous
because it was applied to subsurface resources, forbade relying on highest return, and allowed
classifications to preclude mining).
353. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(7) (West 1986); see id. § 1712(C)(1) (West 1986) (requiring multiple-
use principles for land use planning).
354. FLPMA defines it as "the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual
or regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the public lands consistent with
multiple use." 43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(h) (West 1986).
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latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing
needs and conditions; the use of some land for less than all of the
resources . . . harmonious and coordinated management of the
various resources without permanent impairment of the
productivity of the land and the quality of the environment with
consideration being given to the relative values of the various
resources, and not necessarily to the combination of uses that will
give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output.355
These changes do not greatly impact the thrust of the definition; future
needs are more expressly acknowledged, as is environmental quality, but
the definition tempers impairment concerns by use of the word
"permanent." The BLM is to prevent "permanent" impairment of both
the productivity of the land and quality of the environment.
Another part of the FLPMA definition, however, is not found in the
Forest Service definition:
a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses that takes into
account the long-term needs of future generations for renewable
and nonrenewable resources, including, but not limited to,
recreation, range, timber, minerals, water-shed, wildlife and fish,
and natural scenic, scientific, and historical values. 356
The BLM mandate includes additional resources and, importantly, is
open-ended. One of the named additional resources, minerals, is not
directly within the Forest Service's purview, but the others could readily
be implemented on National Forests. Even without the designation of
these uses as within its mandate, it is unlikely that the Forest Service
would not take into account scenic, scientific, and historical values.
B. Interpretation of Requirement
The "conventional" wisdom is that "multiple use" provides an
ineffectual standard that cannot control the discretion of managers
because it is too subjective.5 7 Courts have reflected this view, finding
judicial review narrow under the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of
355. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(c) (WVest 1986) (emphasis added).
356. Id.
357. See, e.g., Behan, supra note 349; Christopher C. Curtis, Comment, Managing Federal
Lands: Replacing the Multiple Use System, 82 YALE L.. 787, 788 (1973); Strand, Statutory
Authority Governing Management of the National Forest System - Time for a Change?, 7 NAT.
RESOURCES. J. 479 (1974).
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1960."' Case law, therefore, has provided little guidance to those who
must implement "multiple use."
One case that might have provided a more structured process arose
over a Forest Service decision to sell timber in the Tongass National
Forest under a fifty year contract. The district court initially said that the
multiple use mandate required "due" consideration of competing
resources, but this did not mean each should receive equal consideration.
A decision would only be invalid if there was no consideration
whatsoever of a particular resource value. The court directed the Forest
Service to apply its expertise to such considerations.359 The Ninth Circuit
remanded on appeal. It implied that while it accepted the district court's
interpretation for purposes of the remand order, it cautioned: "'[D]ue
consideration' to us requires that the values in question be informedly
and rationally taken into balance. The requirement can hardly be
satisfied by a showing of knowledge of the consequences and a decision
to ignore them.""36 The remand was an unreported.decision and therefore
has no precedential value.
Later courts have refused to overturn multiple-use decisions.
Examining a decision to clear-cut, the district court for Oregon found
that, while a multiple-use decision was not unreviewable, agency
discretion was broad.36' Clear-cutting itself did not violate the
commands of the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, because it
was not an action that would impair productivity of the land.362 In
another case, the BLM committed lands to a single dominant use after
performing a multiple-use review. This was found to be proper.3 63 The
courts, therefore, have not used the multiple-use sustained-yield
commands to hamper agency discretion in any significant way.
Despite the lack of judicial "teeth" to the requirement that the Forest
Service and BLM manage their respective lands for "multiple use,"
professional foresters and land managers apparently feel that the criterion
358. Dorothy Thomas Found., Inc. v. Hardin, 317 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (V.D.N.C. 1970).
359. Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 122-24 (D. Alaska 1971), reversed on other
grounds, sub nom. Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20292 (9th Cir. 1973).
360. Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20292,20293 (9th Cir. 1973).
361. National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Service, 592 F. Supp. 931, 938-39 (D. Or.
1984), appeal dismissed, 801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1986).
362. Id. But see, Sierra Club v. Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Tex. 1993) ( finding that the
National Forest Management Act contemplates using even-aged management techniques only in
exceptional circumstances).
363. Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Management, 684 F. Supp. 1C53, 1056 (D. Or. 1988),
dismissed as moot, 893 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1989).
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has meaning." 4  Additionally, one commentator also believes the
commands could create a control mechanism for agency discretion
because both the courts and Congress do require consideration of all
competing values and some rationality in decisionmaking.365
Nevertheless, one commentator argues that abandoning the multiple-use
concept would actually foster greater efficiency and true diversity of
uses. This would occur by implementing a series of "dominant" uses for
various lands."
VII. CONCLUSION
Public land law demands the attention of both those who want to
preserve and those who want to use our vast national heritage of land and
resources. Conflict between these two perspectives is perhaps the one
consistent factor in all public land law issues. Reflecting these
sometimes competing goals, the law itself is diverse. Different statutes
control each of the various land management systems, and specific
resources are subject to particular statutory regimes. No one interested in
formulating wise policy concerning resource development, however, can
ignore this field, which is crucial to resolving conflicting resource
demands.367
364. Culhane, supra note 347, at 326-27. Harrison Loesch, Multiple Uses of Public
Lands-Accommodation or Choosing Between Conflicting Uses, 16 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. I
(1971) (asserting that reliance on the expertness of the administrator and flexibility of the system is
valuable).
365. George C. Coggins, Of Succotash Syndrome and Vacuous Platitudes: The Meaning of
"Multiple Use, Sustainable Yield"for Public Land Management, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 229, 243-50
(1981) (concluding that past cases are usually deferential to agencies, but require due consideration
and rationality). See also Professor Coggins's argument that these guides become more than
platitudes within the context of FLPMA:
Inherent in the concept are detailed and comprehensive commands to force thinking before
acting and to mold individual actions into a long-range scheme for the public benefit. FLPMA
does not allow the manager to do whatever appears politic or expedient at the time.
Coggins, supra note 202, at 65.
366. Steven E. Daniels, Rethinking Dominant Use Management in the Forest-Planning Era, 17
ENVrL. L. 483 (1987).
367. Additional assistance in this area may be found in the following general works: GEORGE C.
COGGINS, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (1990) (updated); GEORGE C. COGOINS ET AL.,
FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW (3d. ed. 1992), although a casebook, it has valuable
background material and discussions; ERNST C. BAYARD, PUBLIC LAND LAW AND PROCEDURE
(1986); PAUL GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968); JAN G. LAITOS &
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1992), due to the
breadth of coverage, the public lands sections of the Nutshell are of necessity brief. Nevertheless,
the sixty-two page "Table of Cases" may be worth the price of the book and faster than Westlaw or
Lexis when you need an exact citation for a case that is hovering in your memory.
